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xABSTRACT
With the meteoric rise in popularity of the Android platform, there is an urgent need
to combat the accompanying proliferation of malware. Existing work addresses the area of
consumer malware detection, but cannot detect novel, sophisticated, domain-speciﬁc malware
that is targeted speciﬁcally at one aspect of an organization (eg. ground operations of the US
Military). Adversaries can exploit domain knowledge to camoﬂauge malice within the legitimate
behaviors of an app and behind a domain-speciﬁc trigger, rendering traditional approaches such
as signature-matching, machine learning, and dynamic monitoring ineﬀective. Manual code
inspections are also inadequate, scaling poorly and introducing human error. Yet, there is a
dire need to detect this kind of malware before it causes catastrophic loss of life and property.
This dissertation presents the Security Toolbox, our novel solution for this challeng-
ing new problem posed by DARPA's Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity (APAC)
program. We employ a human-in-the-loop approach to amplify the natural intelligence of our
analysts. Our automation detects interesting program behaviors and exposes them in an analy-
sis Dashboard, allowing the analyst to brainstorm ﬂaw hypotheses and ask new questions, which
in turn can be answered by our automated analysis primitives. The Security Toolbox is
built on top of Atlas, a novel program analysis platform made by EnSoft. Atlas uses a graph-
based mathematical abstraction of software to produce a uniﬁed property multigraph, exposes
a powerful API for writing analyzers using graph traversals, and provides both automated and
interactive capabilities to facilitate program comprehension. The Security Toolbox is also
powered by FlowMiner, a novel solution to mine ﬁne-grained, compact data ﬂow summaries
of Java libraries. FlowMiner allows the Security Toolbox to complete a scalable and
accurate partial program analysis of an application without including all of the libraries that it
uses (eg. Android).
xi
This dissertation presents the Security Toolbox, Atlas, and FlowMiner. We pro-
vide empirical evidence of the eﬀectiveness of the Security Toolbox for detecting novel,
sophisticated, domain-speciﬁc Android malware, demonstrating that our approach outperforms
other cutting-edge research tools and state-of-the-art commercial programs in both time and
accuracy metrics. We also evaluate the eﬀectiveness of Atlas as a program analysis platform
and FlowMiner as a library summary tool.
1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
As use of the Android platform has exploded, so too has the prevalence of Android malware.
The vast majority of Android malware is currently unsophisticated and makes little attempt
to hide itself [132, 35, 153]. Many techniques and tools have been developed to detect this
garden-variety consumer malware, including signature matching, machine learning, and dy-
namic behavioral monitoring. However, the US Department of Defense is worried about a very
diﬀerent scenario: novel, sophisticated, domain-speciﬁc malware created to damage a military
or infrastructure target. We are already beginning to witness instances of this. In 2010, the
Stuxnet worm was discovered and found to be speciﬁcally designed to cripple Iranian nuclear
centrifuges [96]. Potential damage is not conﬁned to hardware. For example, it is not diﬃcult to
imagine the loss of life that might result from a military tactical application that malfunctions
when the user is within the GPS bounding box of Afghanistan.
Today's malware detection techniques are woefully unequipped to handle this kind of novel,
domain-speciﬁc, triggerable malware. For this reason, and to spur advancements in the ﬁeld of
static software analysis, DARPA created the Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity
(APAC) program. This thesis describes my research contributions at our Knowledge-Centric
Software Lab during Iowa State University's participation from 2011 to 2015. ISU (with sub-
contractor EnSoft) was a Blue team performer1 tasked with constructing a malware detection
tool. The program also included Red team performers2 whose task was to understand the
research tools and construct challenging new malware that would be diﬃcult to detect, and a
White team performer3 to coordinate controlled malware detection experiments.
1 Other Blue team performers included MIT, Stanford, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Barbara, University of Utah,
University of Washington, and BAE Systems 2 Raytheon BBN and Raytheon Pikewerks 3 Five Directions
2Over the course of APAC Phase 1, our ISU/EnSoft team employed our knowledge-centric
approach to software analysis to establish ourselves as the top-performing Blue team. We
audited 77 challenge applications created by the Red teams, 62 of which contained embedded
malware. We successfully pinpointed the malicious functionality in 57 of 62 malicious apps,
achieving a detection rate of 93.5% and an average analysis time of only 1.13 hours per app.
These accuracy and time metrics were best-in-class among APAC Blue teams, and signiﬁcantly
outperformed a control team using state-of-the-art commercial tooling. Moreover, we frequently
discovered unintended vulnerabilities in the apps we were given. Our success on APAC is directly
attributable to the identiﬁcation of, and novel solutions for, the following research questions:
1. How should a software analysis platform be built to facilitate both automation
and human comprehension?(Section 1.1, Chapter 3)
2. How can a man-machine analysis system detect novel, sophisticated, and
domain-speciﬁc malware? (Section 1.2, Chapter 4)
3. How can expressive, compact information ﬂow summaries be mined from a
library for accurate and scalable partial program analysis? (Section 1.3, Chapter
5)
Organization
This thesis is organized as a collection of papers, each of which addresses one of the research
questions presented above. Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 of this chapter provide general introduc-
tions, motivation, brief related work, and solution previews for each research topic. Chapter
2 provides a comprehensive literature review for all three research questions. Chapters 3, 4,
and 5 are published and pending papers with supplementary appendices containing additional
information, providing treatment of each research question in greater detail. Chapter 6 provides
general concluding thoughts.
31.1 Software Analysis Platform for Automation and Comprehension
Novel, sophisticated, domain-speciﬁc malware cannot be detected in a fully-automated way.
The same behavior may be benign for one application but malicious for another; for example,
a mapping application that sends the device location over the Internet to download the correct
map tiles would be benign, but an SMS messaging application that leaks this same information
would be malicious. While automated tooling can expedite the process of detecting interesting
program behaviors, it cannot make domain-speciﬁc judgment calls about the appropriateness
of a behavior; for this task, a human being is needed. This observation led naturally to our ﬁrst
research question:
How should a software analysis platform be built to facilitate both au-
tomation and human comprehension?
Existing frameworks were insuﬃcient for our purposes, providing either automation or static
visualizations, but we required a ﬂexible and interactive query-model-reﬁne paradigm. To over-
come the limitations of prior work and address this research question, we commissioned our
subcontractor, EnSoft, to create Atlas [50]. Atlas employs a graph-based mathematical ab-
straction of software. It preprocesses the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of a program into a rich,
attributed graph data structure in an in-memory graph database. This software graph can be
queried in automated and interactive ways. Automation is supported through an embedded
Java DSL, allowing automated analyzers to be written on top of Atlas using very few lines
of code. Interaction and comprehension are supported in several ways. First, analysis results
can be viewed using intuitive graph visualizations that have a one-to-one correspondence with
the matching source or byte code. Second, Atlas provides an Interpreter View that allows the
user to compute, query, and visualize results on-demand. Third, analyzers can be invoked auto-
matically in response to user clicks through a conﬁgurable Smart View. For example, this view
can be conﬁgured to instantly display a call graph, type hierarchy, or other artifact whenever
the user clicks on a source token or graph element. This potent combination of automation
and interaction has the eﬀect of amplifying the intelligence of its users, enabling use cases that
would be infeasible to automation or manual eﬀort alone.
4This research question and our solution (Atlas) are discussed in Chapter 3.
1.2 Man-Machine Detection of Malware
On its own, a software analysis platform that enables automation and interaction is not suf-
ﬁcient for malware detection it is a foundation upon which a man-machine detection approach
can be constructed. We recognized immediately that automated tooling can be used to point
out interesting program behaviors, but a human analyst is required for making domain-speciﬁc
judgment calls. The design of such a hybrid system necessitates answers to new questions such
as (i) what behaviors are important to detect?, (ii) what behaviors can a static analysis feasibly
detect?, (iii) how can we present behaviors to an analyst in a comprehensible way?, and (iv) how
can we enable an analyst to eﬀectively pose and answer follow-up questions? More generally:
How can a man-machine analysis system detect novel, sophisticated, and
domain-speciﬁc malware?
Question iv is particularly crucial for addressing the shortcomings of traditional, existing two-
pass defect detection tools. In a traditional two-pass tool, automation performs the ﬁrst pass,
then a human must manually conﬁrm or reject its alarms. This places an unreasonable burden
on the user. Today's malware detection approaches either fall into the two-pass category, or
else they are fully-automated and therefore not suitable for detecting novel, sophisticated, or
domain-speciﬁc malware.
We used Atlas and its APIs to move beyond prior work and create the Security Tool-
box. Unlike conventional two-pass approaches, the Security Toolbox uses an interactive
approach. We detect malware using repeated iterations of automation and interaction; automa-
tion mines the artifacts to expose program behaviors, and the analyst synthesizes the results
and formulates new questions for the automation to answer.
This research question and our solution (the Security Toolbox) are discussed in Chapter
4.
51.3 Library Summaries for Partial Program Analysis
Android applications, like most modern software, are built on top of reusable libraries.
Android provides a massive library of functionality that applications can call that includes all
of the standard Java library. In addition, the Android framework itself makes callbacks into an
application in response to button clicks, interprocedural communication, component lifecycle
changes, and many other events. Thus, analyzing Analyzing an app by itself is a form of partial
program analysis, deﬁned as the analysis of a proper subset of a program's implementation. Due
to the sheer size of the Android framework (orders of magnitude larger than an app), including
it in order to perform whole program analysis was infeasible. Yet failing to capture its behaviors,
particularly information ﬂows, resulted in incomplete results and missed detections from the
APAC performers.
The APAC Blue teams tried radically-divergent approaches to solve this problem. Stanford
hired a small army of graduate and undergraduate students to hand-write coarse information
ﬂow speciﬁcations for important Android APIs, then later worked to dynamically verify them
[40]. This labor-intensive process produced succinct, but coarse, results of varying quality and
coverage. At the other extreme, some performers attempted to include the entire Android
framework into their analysis. This approach tackled the problems of quality and coverage, but
introduced dire problems of computational scalability. Our ISU team felt that the best of both
worlds could be captured by an automated, summary-based approach, if we could answer the
following research question:
How can expressive, compact information ﬂow summaries be mined from
a library for accurate and scalable partial program analysis?
Most prior work on the topic of library summarization focused on strategies for call graph
construction, and thus was unhelpful. While at least one other APAC performer, Stanford,
attempted to summarize library data ﬂows, their results were too coarse to be used accurately
or capture ﬂows involved in callbacks [40]. To aggregate the beneﬁts of their work while avoid-
ing the drawbacks, we designed FlowMiner, an automated tool for extracting ﬁne-grained,
compact data ﬂow summaries of Java library bytecode. FlowMiner employs the graph-based
6analysis paradigm and APIs of Atlas to perform a one-time static analysis of a Java library.
It outputs sound data ﬂow summaries as an abstract data ﬂow graph, encoded using a portable
XML format. This summary ﬁle can be reused by existing static analysis tools to achieve
complete and accurate, yet scalable, partial program analysis.
This research question and our solution (FlowMiner) are discussed in Chapter 4.
7CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This chapter provides a review of literature for each research question.
2.1 Atlas
How should a software analysis platform be built to facilitate both au-
tomation and human comprehension?
Over the years, the ﬁeld of software analysis has exploded into a complex web of loosely-related
tools and techniques. One useful way to divide them is to sort them into static and dynamic
categories. Static analyses reason about a program without running it, while dynamic tech-
niques generally involve running it. Each has strengths and weaknesses. Static analyses excel
at demonstrating hard-to-trigger program behaviors, but often produce false positive alarms.
Dynamic analyses excel at demonstrating the presence of behaviors along common execution
paths, but often struggle to cover them all, leading to false negatives. Use cases such as defect
detection and program comprehension are topics that play to the strengths of static analysis;
therefore, Atlas and its most closely-related work fall into the category of static analysis.
Atlas uses a graph-based mathematical abstraction to reason about software this concept
has a rich history. Ferrante et al. introduced the Program Dependence Graph[67] to explicitly
capture both control and data dependencies of a program. Horwitz et al. proved the adequacy
of program dependence graphs for representing programs. They showed that the expression of
abstract syntax as a graph enables compilation, optimization, and even the checking of deep
properties such as program equivalence [81]. This proof laid the groundwork for an explosion of
subsequent related work, such as the Program Dependence Web[108], to represent programs as
8graphs, leading to the modern Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) and eventually to approaches like
Atlas.
2.1.1 Program Comprehension
One of the most natural applications of static analysis is program comprehension. Since
the introduction of the PDG, researchers have imagined how program graphs could be used
to support and empower developers. Ottenstein and Ottenstein imagined how a PDG might
be used in an Interactive Development Environment (IDE) to support common development
tasks, such as refactoring, debugging, and understanding program structure [109]. They saw
visualization as a critical component of program comprehension. In 1983, Tischler proposed
MAP, a static program analysis tool for understanding COBOL source programs. MAP includes
elements from control ﬂow analysis, data ﬂow analysis, structure, and interactive visualization
[136]. Unfortunately, as Frederick Brooks pointed out in 1987, software is very diﬃcult to
visualize because it has no inherent spacial representation [30]. The comprehension gap resulting
from this diﬃculty is very real Parnas and Lawford note that despite sincere eﬀorts to ensure
software quality, large software companies routinely release software containing errors. They
assert that the problem stems not from lack of eﬀort, but from the sheer complexity of modern
software systems. They propose that frequent code inspections and program comprehension are
critical to ﬁnding bugs prior to release [110].
Uniﬁed Modeling Language[124] (UML) diagrams were introduced as a visual way to com-
municate software requirements and design. Unfortunately, they have proven to be suboptimal
for most use cases, including program comprehension[55]. Radfelder et al. pointed out the
failings of UML, particularly for representing dynamic program behaviors. They suggested
three-dimensional visualization as one way to solve the problem [118]. Kazman et al. presented
Dali, a workbench to extract architectural information about an existing system. It extracts
architectural patterns and visualizations to serve as ex-post-facto documentation [90]. Neginhal
and Kothari proposed CVision, a tool for understanding C system software. CVision, a philo-
sophical ancestor of Atlas, is an interactive tool allowing the user to visualize relationships
between program elements at various levels of abstraction. Reduced views (abstractions) are
9obtained by applying graph reductions to distill the code down to only relevant relationships.
The system was evaluated and shown to be eﬀective in aiding understanding of Xinu and Linux
[106]. Recent work on software visualization includes SourceMiner[46], an Eclipse plug-in for
software visualization. SourceMiner uses the AST as a base from which to create various struc-
tural views of software, as well as software metrics such as coupling and cohesion. It focuses
exclusively on program structure and does not visualize runtime relationships; this limits its
general usefulness and applicability. Werner et al. introduced EvolTrack[142], an Eclipse plug-
in for visualizing the evolution of software. EvolTrack provides various meta-views of software,
including mapping to and from UML diagrams, but is primarily intended for visualizing the
transformation of software over time rather than deeply comprehending one software artifact.
Femmer et al. proposed BusyBorg[66], an alternative to UML for visualizing program structure
and runtime behaviors, particularly for embedded system software. It incorporates aspects of
static program analysis, network monitoring, and proﬁling to show system-level interactions
between executables and classes within them. Atlas moves beyond this prior work, providing
rich, interactive visualizations of both structure and runtime behaviors. Moreover, the visual-
izations that Atlas produces have a one-to-one live correspondence with the backing software
graph data structure; visual elements can be selected and directly used as inputs for analyzers.
Visualization is only one requisite component of program comprehension. Tilley and Paul
described the features of an ideal reverse engineering tool for understanding programs. Such
a system, they said, should create useful semantic abstractions, but should leave room for
human insight and input [135]. Biggerstaﬀ et al. presented the DESIRE platform based on
the observation that we understand programs by associating implementation concepts with
abstract domain concepts from our everyday lives. In order to understand unfamiliar software,
they reasoned, we must be able to map implementation details to concepts in our daily lives, a
notion they refer to as the concept assignment problem. They argued that eﬀective program
comprehension platforms must consider this problem by employing familiar concepts such as
relationships, clusters, and slices [28]. Bennett and Ward described middle out programming
for program comprehension. Reinforcing the view that domain concepts are critical for program
comprehension, they argued that pure top-down or bottom-up ways of understanding software
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are not how comprehension works in the real world [27]. Kothari and Deng also proposed the
use of domain concepts to understand software. They described a user-customizable software
engineering environment called SeeCORE for deriving a program skeleton upon which domain
concepts can be applied [51].
In addition to domain concepts, Rajlich argued that they key to program comprehension
is understanding and communicating the original developers' intentions. Without intention,
analysts can see what was done, but not necessarily why it was done. Despite the wide variety
of program comprehension tools and techniques, he concluded that no one existing tool or
technique can facilitate comprehension in a automated way. Instead we must choose trade-
oﬀs related to level of automation, level of detail, properties captured, and more [119]. Schots
et al. agreed, noting that use of computing resources to aid in understanding software is
still a challenge. They pointed out that program comprehension is critical for all parts of
the development life cycle. Their survey of tools, methodologies, and current research in the
area reinforced the view that no single existing tool seems to fulﬁll all comprehension needs.
However, they did point out the important research trend of proper abstractions to capture
details of interest while discarding others [129].
From this philosophical background, Atlas was born. In 2008, Kothari presented a Query-
Model-Reﬁne paradigm for understanding large software. His proposal was that a human analyst
should use an analysis tool in iterations. Queries would return abstract software models which,
upon consideration by the user, could be used to inspire more queries and reﬁne results [91].
Indeed, this philosophy came to be the guiding principle for the construction and use of Atlas,
and is the prime factor for its success as a powerful program comprehension tool.
2.1.2 Detecting Defects
Program comprehension is far from the only use for static analysis tools. Automation and the
ability to reason about a program globally allow static analysis tools to excel at ﬁnding obscure
and hard-to-trigger program defects. A huge number of defect-ﬁnding tools exist, falling into
a number of categories. The ﬁrst category is that of tools to aid with code inspections. Fagan
argued that frequent code and design audits are eﬀective tools to reduce bugs and increase
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software quality [62]. Countless others have echoed this sentiment 25 years after Fagan's initial
work [17], and tool support for code inspection has increased dramatically [10]. Indeed, Atlas
itself was shaped by the use case of interactive code inspection for security audits.
Another massive category of static defect detection tools is that of automated bug-ﬁnding.
Perhaps the single best-known bug ﬁnding tool is FindBugs, created by Hovemeyer and Pugh.
FindBugs works by deﬁning and detecting common idioms and code patterns that often indicate
bugs. These patterns, even when extremely simple, tend to ﬁnd real bugs in production software
[82, 19]. Ayewah et al. provided an evaluation of FindBugs for defect detection on production
software. They concluded that many of the detected bugs are real, though often trivial, and that
many companies do not have systematic strategies for reviewing warnings from tools. They also
noted that there is a long tail of bug detection patterns that rarely, if ever, ﬁnd problems [20].
Others have criticized FindBugs for the number of false alarms it gives. Vetro et al. performed
an empirical study of the precision of FindBugs for a body of software developed at a university.
They found that very few of the issues that FindBugs reports have high precision that is, the
majority of warnings that FindBugs raises are false positives, and therefore are not particularly
useful for ensuring software quality [140]. Among other tools, Bush et al. proposed a static
analyzer, PREﬁx, for ﬁnding dynamic programming errors. They noted that 90% of C and
C++ bugs involve interactions between multiple functions, so local warnings within functions
are not suﬃcient to ﬁnd them. PREﬁx uses a bottom-up approach to create a summary model
of the eﬀects of each function. It then performs interprocedural analysis by composing the
eﬀects of models along calls [32]. Hovemeyer et al. employed static analysis to detect null
pointer dereference bugs in Java programs. They perform a forward intra-procedural data ﬂow
analysis from null literals, categorizing variable deﬁnitions as deﬁnitely null, deﬁnitely not null,
or possibly null. If a dereference occurs upon a variable that may be null, an alarm is raised.
Subsequently, a path feasibility analysis discards some warnings that are likely to be false
positives, though this introduces some false negatives [83]. Pienaar and Hundt created JSWhiz,
a static analysis tool for detecting memory leaks in JavaScript. They identify ﬁve common code
patterns leading to memory leaks. JSWhiz extends the Closure JavaScript compiler, using its
back end to identify and warn when such patterns are found [114]. Wu et al. employ static
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analysis to check exception handling in Java programs [144]. Many, many other bug-ﬁnding
static analysis tools have been developed, and are beyond the scope of this thesis to list.
Innocent bugs become vulnerabilities when they lead to security problems. Sotirov pre-
sented static analysis techniques to detect vulnerabilities in C programs. He identiﬁed several
code patterns characteristic of vulnerabilities, then employed taint analysis and value range
propagation to detect execution paths exhibiting these patterns. The approach is implemented
as an extension to the GNU C compiler [131]. Austin et al. performed a comparison survey of
vulnerability discovery techniques, including exploratory manual penetration testing, system-
atic manual penetration testing, automated penetration testing, and automated static analysis.
Each technique had is own strengths and weaknesses. Systematic manual penetration testing
found the most design ﬂaws, while static analysis found the most implementation bugs [18].
When comparing penetration tools against static analysis tools for detecting SQL injection vul-
nerabilities, Antunes and Vieira found that static analysis tools oﬀer better coverage, though
both approaches suﬀer from problems of false positive alarms [11]. Kannavara argued that static
analysis tools should be incorporated in early stages of the software development process, im-
mediately after new modules have been implemented. He recommended that client companies
run static analysis tools on open source projects before using them in products [89]. McLean
compared a number of static analysis tools for detecting vulnerabilities on a body of open-source
software. He found that diﬀerent static analysis tools are useful for detecting diﬀerent kinds of
vulnerabilities. He also found that tools tend to raise a large number of warnings that are false
positives [103]. Perhaps most philosophically close to Atlas, Yamaguchi et al. proposed the
use of Code Property Graphs[146] for modeling and detecting vulnerabilities using traversals
on a uniﬁed graph data structure. The CPG combines concepts such as control ﬂow graphs,
abstract syntax trees, and program dependence graphs into a single data structure that can be
queried. Using a CPG, vulnerabilities can be expressed concisely using traversal templates.
In a review of several bug-ﬁnding tools, including Bandera, ESC/Java 2, FindBugs, JLint,
and PMD, Rutar et al. found that the tools ﬁnd diﬀerent subsets of software bugs, and suggested
using them together in a meta-tool that provides better accuracy by combining warnings [125].
Meng et al. extended this work by proposing a way to merge the results of separate static
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analysis tools. They proposed uniform speciﬁcations of defect patterns, as well as policies for
prioritizing results [104]. On balance, Johnson and Bowdidge noted that static analysis tools
are still woefully underutilized when it comes to ﬁnding bugs. They found that developers
encounter too many false positive warnings, most of which are diﬃcult to comprehend. In
addition, most static analysis tools do not include interactive mechanisms to help developers
address their warnings [87]. Heckman and Williams also noted that a large portion of static
analysis warnings are false positives, with only a small portion being actionable. They proposed
the use of machine learning techniques to classify alerts as actionable or not actionable. By
selecting 51 characteristics of warnings, their machine learning algorithms classiﬁed 88-97% of
alerts correctly. They noted that the algorithms and characteristics that worked best diﬀered by
project, so they suggested that alert classiﬁcation should be tuned by speciﬁc project properties
[77].
Kothari et al. worked to address this problem of false alarms by proposing a Knowledge Cen-
tric Software framework consisting of an eXtensible Common Intermediate Language (XCIL)
and an eXtensible Pattern Speciﬁcation Language (XPSL) for representing domain-speciﬁc
knowledge and detecting safety property violations in a language-independent way. They pro-
posed bug detection through inspection and comprehension, in which an analyst could encode
domain-speciﬁc patterns that indicate property violations based on the results of exploration.
The automation, then, could be used to discover the existence of these patterns in safety-critical
code [92]. As a test of this philosophy, Gui and Kothari examined matching pair properties,
wherein an event A should be followed by an event B on every execution path. If there is an
execution path on which A is not followed by B, this constitutes a bug. Examples include syn-
chronization and memory allocation and deallocation. They provided an empirical study of the
Linux kernel and used program comprehension tooling to experimentally ﬁnd the programming
patterns along which matching pair properties occur. Based on this survey, they created the
concept of a Matching Pair Graph, MPG(X), which constitutes the minimum-sized call graph
that must be considered in order to verify a matching pair property for X [76]. This philosophy
of combining user insight with automation to reduce false alarms lives on with Atlas today.
Atlas is not itself a bug ﬁnding tool; however, it can be and has been used as a base for writing
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bug-ﬁnding tools. More about the use of Atlas to detect novel and sophisticated malware is
presented in Chapter 4.
2.1.3 Designing Test Cases
A widely-recognized challenge in testing is the problem of designing good test cases. Static
analysis tools can be used for this purpose. Laski and Korel suggested employing data-ﬂow
oriented static program analysis as a means to create test cases. Their ﬁrst strategy was to
examine uses of variables and check the liveness of every deﬁnition at these points. A second
strategy tests vectors of variables at once, testing the liveness of a permutation of deﬁnitions
at points of use. They concluded that good test cases can automatically be inferred from these
data ﬂow analyses [98]. Bates and Horwitz proposed the use of program dependence graphs
and program slices to incrementally test programs. They suggested that, starting from points
at which a program has been modiﬁed, static program slices can be used to evaluate the impact
of changes. This impact directly corresponds to existing tests that need to be updated, and
new tests that should be written [24].
A more recent proposal of program analysis for test generation came from Godefried et al.
They observed that despite their popularity, static analysis tools are not yet widely used for
automatic test generation. They described three tools at Microsoft that are moving towards
this goal, all of which incorporate static analysis techniques like symbolic execution, model
checking, and constraint solving. One tool, SAGE, generates white-box fuzz testing inputs for
ﬁnding security problems. Another tool, PEX, synthesizes automatic unit tests for .NET. The
third tool, Yogi, combines testing and static analysis to simultaneously work on proofs and
counterexamples for whether a desired program property holds [71]. We have not employed
Atlas in the area of automatic test case generation, although we have every expectation that
the necessary raw materials for doing so are captured.
2.1.4 Analysis as a Platform
At its core, Atlas is a static program analysis platform, providing a software graph database
and a powerful query API for allowing others to write analyses. Many other program analysis
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platforms have been created. One well-known platform is Soot[95], a compilation toolchain for
the Jimple intermediate representation language. Many bug-ﬁnding tools and optimizers have
been written on top of the Soot tool chain. Lam et al. created a static analysis database for
context-sensitive pointer analysis called bddbddb. It uses a Datalog embedded query language
called PQL. The authors spent a man-year optimizing the implementation of bddbddb to scale
to large software [94]. Another approach to building static analysis platforms involves encoding
program properties as boolean satisﬁability (SAT) problem instances and solving them using
SAT-solvers. Frameworks that take this approach include CALYSTO[21] and SATURN[145].
Atlas diﬀers from all of these platforms in several ways. First, it reasons about software using a
graph-based mathematical abstraction, relying upon reachability properties rather than boolean
formulations. Second, it places heavy emphasis on user interaction, visualization, and program
comprehension, aﬀording an unprecedented level of usability. Third, Atlas preprocesses the
AST, allowing analyzers to be written at a much higher level of abstraction than is typical
on other platforms. This allows for incredibly powerful analyses to be written using very few
lines of code. For example, after deciding that we needed a symbolic value analysis for our
participation on APAC, I created a complete tool in one day using fewer than 4kLOC.
2.2 ISU Security Toolbox
How can a man-machine analysis system detect novel, sophisticated, and
domain-speciﬁc malware?
2.2.1 Nature of Android Malware
Malware detection for Android applications has been an extremely hot topic from 2011 to
the present day this stems from the open nature of the Android platform, its skyrocketing
popularity, and the accompanying proliferation of malware. Spreitzenbarth noted that the
prevalence of Android malware increased 3000% in the second half of 2011 alone, and that
the vast majority of malware made no attempt to hide or obfuscate itself. He observed that
malware was typically proﬁt-driven and simplistic, but was quickly becoming more complex as
detection tools improved [132]. A 2011 survey by Castillo et al. at McAfee also observed that
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while malware was spreading quickly, it was unsophisticated and made few attempts to evade
detection. As detection tools improved, they noted that malware increasingly employed ob-
fuscation, dynamic downloading of payloads, on-the-ﬂy code encryption/decryption, and other
well-known techniques from the realm of PC malware. [35]
Unfortunately, the standard signature-based approach to malware from the PC world is
not working well. Zhou and Jiang provided a survey of the behaviors of 1, 200 malware sam-
ples, ﬁnding that state-of-the-art commercial anti-virus products detected only 20% to 80% of
malware samples. This low detection rate came despite the low sophistication and simple proﬁt-
driven motives of Android malware. They too concluded that as malware became increasingly
sophisticated, these detection numbers would get worse [153].
Suarez-Tangil et al. recently surveyed the 20 most well-regarded analysis tools, providing a
picture of how malware has evolved over several years to evade them. They noted that malware
is still proﬁt-driven, but is becoming increasingly ﬂexible and adaptive to evade detection by
even state-of-the-art tools [134]. Indeed, researchers have demonstrated that it is still easy
to exﬁltrate sensitive device data and bypass today's state-of-the-art tooling [54, 93], and that
adversaries have an enormous number of attack vectors at their disposal. Apvrille and Strazzere
posited that rather than trying to detect malware, end-users might instead evaluate apps using
a risk-based statistical scoring system based on API methods called, permissions requested, size
of code, contained URLs, and other features [12]. However, many users may not have suﬃcient
risk appetite to take a probabilistic approach to their security.
This is particularly true in a DoD scenario; any non-zero probability of malware in a deployed
app could destroy lives and property. Insuﬃciency of existing tooling to handle these malware
trends was a primary motivation of the APAC program, and is the inspiration for our Security
Toolbox. Rather than relying upon the failed signature and heuristic-based approaches of
the past, the Security Toolbox puts a human-in-the-loop, amplifying his or her natural
intelligence.
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2.2.2 Machine Learning
When faced with a problem whose solution is diﬃcult to codify, practitioners are inevitably
tempted to apply machine learning techniques to develop a classiﬁer. So it was with the detection
of Android malware. A number of researchers proposed the use of static feature vectors, such
as the size of an application, permissions requested, permissions used, metadata, source or byte
code strings, and control ﬂow graph (CFG) features [126, 149, 13, 152, 1, 84, 16, 120, 128].
Others suggested the use of dynamic behaviors for feature vectors, including API calls, ﬁred
Intents, and other system events [130, 53]. The eﬀectiveness of the approaches varies. Feizollah
et al. surveyed 100 recent machine-learning techniques used to detect Android malware. They
found that feature vectors include static, dynamic, metadata, and hybrid features, with static
and dynamic features tied for popular use. They concluded that most work did not use data
sets of suﬃcient size for drawing statistically-valid conclusions. [64]
Machine learning techniques for malware detection are not suitable when the threat model
assumes that malware will be novel, sophisticated, and very dissimilar from simplistic commer-
cial malware. This was our situation during the APAC program; it was assumed that malware
created by a nation-state adversary would be novel, domain-speciﬁc, and very diﬃcult to discern
from intended application behaviors. Unlike the prior work using machine learning techniques,
the Security Toolbox was designed speciﬁcally for this scenario.
2.2.3 Dynamic Testing and Sandboxing
Researchers have proposed various categories of testing and emulation for exposing malicious
behaviors of Android apps. Burguera et al. created CrowDroid, a crowd-sourced dynamic be-
havior analysis tool. CrowDroid collects application event traces on many devices and submits
them to a central location, where traces can be compared against those from known malware
samples [31]. Reina et al. introduced CopperDroid, a dynamic behavior analysis tool. Cop-
perDroid logs and reports application system calls for subsequent post-processing by a user
or another tool [121]. Alazab et al. suggested dynamic execution of Android applications
within sandboxes to discover malicious behaviors [5]. Weichselbaum et al. created Andrubis,
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a fully-automated emulation and test framework that automatically generates test cases using
the results of a static analysis [141]. Enck et al. proposed TaintDroid, a system-wide dynamic
taint tracking system. TaintDroid monitors ﬂows of sensitive information in real-time, reporting
leaks immediately when they are observed [60]. Unfortunately, others have found that detection
by TaintDroid can be easily avoided by a handful of well-known techniques, including implicit
information ﬂow and use of covert channels [127]. Finally, Yan and Yin created DroidScope, a
proﬁling emulation environment for dynamically reverse-engineering previously-identiﬁed mal-
ware [148].
There are several problems with dynamic testing approaches for malware detection. First,
they tend to identify a malicious application only after it has done something malicious. In
security-critical scenarios, this reactive model is unacceptable. Second, it is not diﬃcult for
malware to detect that it is being run in an emulation environment and modify its behavior
to avoid detection. Third, the novel and sophisticated malware considered by DARPA for
its APAC program is triggerable by an adversary. As any software test engineer knows, it is
infeasible to cover all possible execution paths and inputs. Therefore, the malware that the
DoD worries about and that the Security Toolbox is designed to detect is very likely to
pass through dynamic testing approaches undetected.
2.2.4 Changes to the Android Platform
A number of security improvements to the Android platform itself have been proposed. Enck
et al. proposed Kirin, a security service for Android that performs install-time certiﬁcation
against a set of security policies [61]. Poeplau et al. investigated the dynamic code loading
features of the Android platform. They note that up to 16% of the top free applications
dynamically download and load code, suggesting that Android could be made more secure if
the framework included integrity checks for loaded code [116]. Jeon et al. suggested that
Android could be a much safer platform if ﬁner-grained permissions were introduced. They
demonstrated a prototype ﬁne-grained permission model, showing that application permissions
could be auto-detected without changes to functionality [86]. Grace et al. created Woodpecker,
a tool for checking the enforcement of permissions in Android device images. They found that
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vendors frequently fail to correctly enforce permissions in system images, allowing permissions
to be leaked to applications that should not have them [73]. Au et al. created PScout, a
tool for automatic static extraction of the Android permission model. They noted that between
18% and 26% of permissions could be entirely eliminated if applications were constrained to
call only publically-documented APIs [15].
It is true that many security features of Android could be improved, and that the mapping
of permissions required to use each API method is poorly-documented. In fact, the Secu-
rity Toolbox directly leverages permission mappings produced by PScout to overcome this
problem. However, an eﬀective malware detection tool should be able to address Android as it
exists today. Even if future improvements were introduced by Google, legacy versions of Android
would still be used for years to come. Thus, the Security Toolbox makes no presumptions
of improvements or changes to Android.
2.2.5 Two-Pass Analysis Systems
Our most closely-related work, and the current state-of-the-art, is a group of traditional
two-pass static analysis tools. In the ﬁrst pass, the tools run in a fully-automated way to gather
evidence. In the second pass, a human must manually review the reports. The vast majority of
static analysis tooling, including malware detection tooling, runs in this manner. Some of the
most widely-regarded two-pass analysis tools for Android vulnerability and malware detection
include, in roughly chronological order:
 SCanDroid, a static analyzer that infers allowed information ﬂows from the application
manifest, comparing these against statically-computed ﬂows [70]
 Androlyzer, a static report generator for Android APKs that reports APIs, libraries,
permissions used, and app structure [26]
 ComDroid, a static analyzer for inter-process communication (Intent) vulnerabilities [39]
 Stowaway, a static analyzer to detect requested, but unnecessary, permissions [65]
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 CHEX, a static analyzer for detecting component hijacking vulnerabilities, Intents that
are assumed to be internal but can be intercepted by external apps [101]
 SmartDroid, a hybrid static/dynamic analysis tool for identifying UI actions that are
likely triggers for unusual behaviors [151]
 RiskRanker, a static heuristic-based approach for predicting that an app is malicious[72]
 SAAF, a static analysis framework for identifying suspicious ﬂows with backward program
slices from parameters of sensitive methods [78]
 Anadroid, an abstract interpretation approach to malware detection employing techniques
to consider all possible event sequences [100]
 AsDroid, a static analyzer that compares UI text labels against actions that are taken
during UI callbacks [85]
 Dendroid, a static analyzer using binary edit distance metrics to compute clusters and
form a phylogenic tree of malware by its similarity [133]
 FlowDroid, the highly-regarded static taint analyzer extending the IDFS algorithm with
a lifecycle model for Android apps [14, 69]
While each of these two-pass solutions brings novel contributions to the ﬁeld, they all share
a common weakness the human analyst is only involved after the automation has ﬁnished
producing its results. This means the analyst is left to sift through reported problems, which
often appear in cryptic formats and with little helpful evidence to justify the report, without
tool assistance. In other words, the task of rejecting false positives becomes a time-consuming,
manual eﬀort.
By contrast, the Security Toolbox was designed from the ground up to be a human-in-
the-loop malware detection system. The analyst and automation work together to synthesize
results; analyst questions can be answered by artifacts produced by the automation, which then
inspire further questions. This human-in-the-loop approach allows the Security Toolbox to
be much better at detecting novel, domain-speciﬁc, sophisticated malware that would be missed
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by other tools. It also allows our analysts to avoid a burdensome post-automation manual review
phase. We credit our out-performance versus other APAC teams to this important distinction.
2.3 FlowMiner
How can expressive, compact information ﬂow summaries be mined from
a library for accurate and scalable partial program analysis?
2.3.1 Deﬁning Partial Program Analysis
The term partial program analysis can be deﬁned in at least two ways. Degenais deﬁned the
concept to mean the analysis of a subset of a compiling program P. In this deﬁnition, the subset
itself need not compile. He described the problem of type inference in partial Java programs,
wherein a referenced artifact (a class, ﬁeld, etc) is simply missing [44]. Degenais et al. then
proposed a framework to accomplish this type inference, partially recovering declared types of
expressions [45]. Similarly, Balatsouras and Smaragdakis developed a tool called JPhantom
to handle references to missing types from libraries using class hierarchy complementation.
JPhantom generates stand-in superclasses so that type hierarchies can become consistent for
other analysis systems, such as Soot [23]. Madsen et al. proposed the analysis of JavaScript
libraries with a focus on how a library is used. They observed that the types of values passed as
parameters to a library call can be useful for inferring the type of library method return values
and application callback parameters [102].
This is diﬀerent than the standard deﬁnition of partial program analysis that we, and most
others, use. In our deﬁnition, the subset of P to be analyzed does compile (all referenced artifacts
are deﬁned), but the implementation of libraries is not given. That is, an application is built
and analyzed against a set of library stubs that express only the signature of the library APIs.
This deﬁnition and scenario addressed by FlowMiner are much more common in practice
than the analysis of a non-compiling program described by Degenais.
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2.3.2 Control Flow
The majority of the work on partial program analysis has focused on call and control
ﬂow graph construction. Early eﬀorts included Class Hierarchy Analysis[47] and Rapid Type
Analysis[22], proposed as structural type hierarchy-based techniques for inferring possible run-
time types at dynamic dispatch call sites. These techniques do not summarize control ﬂows in a
library, but rather provide a way to conservatively over-approximate for dispatch calculations.
Grove and Chambers noted that an interprocedural call graph is a key prerequisite for other
kinds of analysis, proposing a framework for call graph construction algorithms [74]. Ali and
Lhotak proposed in CGC that all possible library targets be summarized by a single node in the
call graph [7]. They later created Averroes, a tool for generating library placeholders for pro-
gram analysis. Averroes leverages the assumption that libraries must compile in a context that
does not include a client application. The placeholders over-approximate all possible library
behaviors [8, 6]. Unfortunately, because they massively over-approximate library behaviors, use
of CGC and Averroes is extremely inaccurate and produces a huge number of false positive
analysis results.
In more closely-related work, Probst noted the problems posed by dynamic dispatches in
object oriented languages and of partial program analysis. He proposed a one-time library
analysis that uses a type constraint graph for type inference, allowing an interprocedural control
ﬂow graph for a library to be constructed [117]. FlowMiner also performs a one-time analysis
of a library, but the target of our analysis is the extraction of data ﬂow features rather than
control ﬂow features.
Yan et al. proposed summary-based whole-program analysis, wherein library implementa-
tion can be replaced with automatically-computed summaries that are independent of subse-
quent analysis use cases this is the philosophy of FlowMiner as well. However, they focused
on the mechanics of incorporating summary generation support into existing frameworks, par-
ticularly Soot, while FlowMiner addresses the algorithms and graph schema used to express
summaries, as well as the mechanics of one tool (Atlas) [147].
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Cao et al. recently created EdgeMiner, a tool for automatically mining callback/registration
pairs from a Java library. Registration methods are API methods with which an application
can provide an object reference to a library, while callbacks are library call sites from which
a polymorphic call can be made on a registered object. EdgeMiner computes a conﬁguration
ﬁle of possible registration/callback pairs, allowing a partial program analysis tool to capture
possible callbacks in its call graph [34]. This information is implicit in the data ﬂow summaries
generated by FlowMiner; any call site that could possibly have more than one runtime target
(eg. callbacks) is preserved to be resolved at the time of summary application. In addition,
we capture the ﬂow of object references to call sites, allowing possible registration to be
discovered. Hence, EdgeMiner could have been directly implemented as an analysis use case on
top of the summaries generated by FlowMiner.
2.3.3 Data Flow
There is very little closely-related work for summarizing data ﬂow properties of libraries. For
one partial program analysis use case, Chapman et al. and Amey et al. proposed annotating
library API methods with their trusted security levels. If a partial program ﬂow reaches an API
whose security level is untrusted, a problem can be reported without the implementation details
of ﬂows within the library [36, 9]. Unlike FlowMiner, this approach is manually-cumbersome
and applies only to one security use case.
Rountev et al. provided a theoretical framework for Component-Level Data-ﬂow Analysis, a
one-time analysis of library source to create a condensed Inter-Procedural Control Flow Graph
(ICFG). The ICFG consists of function-level data ﬂow summaries connected by interprocedural
calls [122]. Like FlowMiner, the authors recognized the importance of capturing callbacks in
summaries. Unlike FlowMiner, they did not provide a concrete implementation, and did not
handle class member ﬁelds in full generality.
Our most closely-related work was done by Clapp et al., who presented a technique for
mining coarse information ﬂow speciﬁcations from concrete executions of a Java library. Their
approach instruments a library and uses a test driver to make API calls and generate ﬂow traces.
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These traces are post-processed into coarse information ﬂow speciﬁcations, which are expressed
as annotations on library methods. [40]
There are several issues with this work. The ﬁrst drawback stems from the authors' use
of dynamic analysis to identify information ﬂow relationships between the input and output
variables of a method; this inherently makes it infeasible to cover all possible paths in the library,
unavoidably introducing false negatives. Second, the information ﬂow speciﬁcations produced
are too coarse to be used accurately; information ﬂow is tracked at the level of granularity of
objects rather than the granularity of ﬁelds and other variables. This causes unrelated ﬂows to
become conﬂated. For example, a method parameter which is written to a ﬁeld of an object is
considered to "taint" the entire object. Therefore, ﬂows through unrelated ﬁelds are joined to
the same taint, producing false positives.
Third, their information ﬂow speciﬁcations express ﬂows only between elements of the
library's public surface (API), throwing away all other ﬂows through intermediate variables.
This limits the ability of a subsequent static analysis to use the mined speciﬁcations in an
accurate way. For example, a static analyzer might have used the details of calling contexts
and object types to restrict a library ﬂow to valid constraints, but these details are not present
in the ﬂow speciﬁcations. Fourth, their ﬂow speciﬁcations fail to capture potential ﬂows from
a library back into an application via polymorphic call sites. For example, an application can
deﬁne a subtype of a library type, providing overriding method deﬁnitions. At runtime, virtual
call sites in the library may result in calls and ﬂows back into the application.
FlowMiner addresses all four issues. In contrast to the work by Clapp et al., we use
static analysis (built atop the Atlas platform) instead of dynamic analysis to identify possible
ﬂows within the library. Hence, we avoid the possibility that some execution paths are not
covered. Next, the ﬂow speciﬁcations extracted by FlowMiner track and preserve data ﬂows
at the granularity of individual variables and deﬁnitions within methods and objects, so we
avoid falsely merging unrelated ﬂows. Furthermore, our ﬂow speciﬁcations express ﬂows among
program elements that are not necessarily on the library API. This allows subsequent analyses
to be context, ﬁeld, type, object, and ﬂow-sensitive. Finally, we retain the details of virtual call
sites so that ﬂows involving potential callbacks into an application are captured.
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CHAPTER 3. ATLAS: A NEW WAY TO EXPLORE SOFTWARE,
BUILD ANALYSIS TOOLS
This paper was presented at ICSE in June of 2014 in Hydurabad, India and published in
the Companion Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software Engineering [50].
Material in Section 3.7 has been added for this thesis and does not appear in the original paper.
This work addresses our ﬁrst research question: How should a software analysis platform
be built to facilitate both automation and human comprehension?
Tom Deering123, Suresh Kothari3, Jeremias Sauceda4, Jon Mathews4
Abstract
Atlas is a new software analysis platform from EnSoft Corp. Atlas decouples the domain-
speciﬁc analysis goal from its underlying mechanism by splitting analysis into two distinct
phases. In the ﬁrst phase, polynomial-time static analyzers index the software AST, building a
rich graph database. In the second phase, users can explore the graph directly or run custom
analysis scripts written using a convenient API. These features make Atlas ideal for both inter-
action and automation. In this paper, we describe the motivation, design, and use of Atlas. We
present validation case studies, including the veriﬁcation of safe synchronization of the Linux
kernel, and the detection of malware in Android applications. Our ICSE 2014 demo explores
the comprehension and malware detection use cases.
Video: http://youtu.be/cZOWlJ-IO0k
1 Primary author 2 Author for correspondence 3 Graduate student and advisor, respectively. Department
of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University. 4 Primary researcher, EnSoft Corp.
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3.1 Motivation
Today's software is growing larger and more complex at an alarming rate, but our cognitive
abilities as practitioners are ﬁxed. We increasingly rely on tooling to break through the com-
prehension threshold shown in Figure 3.1. Many tools remain isolated to academia [42], but
Atlas aims to bring practical software analysis to the masses.
Cognitive
Burden
Software Size/Complexity
Manual
Analysis
Feasible Tool (Atlas)
Assistance
Needed
Figure 3.1: Atlas helps comprehend complex software.
Static analysis tools traditionally suﬀer from false positives due to over-approximation of
program behaviors. Prior work seeks to address this with increasingly sensitive and expensive
analyses. A common technique is to express analyses properties in terms of satisﬁability (SAT),
where basic blocks have been labeled with boolean reachability predicates, relying upon ad-
vancements in SAT solver scalability. Recent tools pursuing this approach include SATURN[3]
and CALYSTO[21]. Reduction techniques such as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD)[4] and
Event Flow Graphs (EFG)[2] may allow the sizes of the necessary control ﬂow graphs and
boolean formulations to be greatly reduced; however, not every analysis query can be easily
formulated as a SAT problem, and fully-sensitive analyses remain prohibitively expensive.
While it is possible to script a traditional static analysis using Atlas, we propose an alterna-
tive. Atlas breaks analysis into two phases. First, a set of conservative, polynomial time static
analyzers translate the software AST into a graph database of precomputed artifacts and rela-
tionships. Then, a user can directly query and interact with that database to quickly discharge
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false positives and iteratively reﬁne the results (see Section 3.3). This approach allows an ana-
lyst to supply critical invariants, insights, and software design knowledge which would otherwise
be unavailable to a fully-automated approach. Software mining has been explored in the past
in work such as CIA [38], GENOA [52], SCRUPLE [111], SCA [112], Software Bookshelf [58],
GUPRO [57], Metanool [29], and GReQL [56]. However, to our knowledge, none of these tools
oﬀer the same ease of use or blend of automation and interactivity. In this way, Atlas seeks
to be an intelligence amplifying system as proposed by Fred Brooks: If indeed our objective is
to build computer systems that solve very challenging problems, my thesis is that IA > AI that
is, that intelligence amplifying systems can, at any given level of available systems technology,
beat AI systems. That is, a machine and a mind can beat a mind-imitating machine working by
itself. [88]
3.2 Audience & Use Cases
android.jar
java.security
MessageDigest
getInstance
algorithm
connectbot
sk.vx.connectbot.util
Encryptor
<clinit>
→ block →
"SHA-256" DIGEST_ALGORITHM
decrypt
→ block
algorithm
encrypt
→ block
algorithm
DIGEST_ALGORITHM
df(inter)
df(inter)df(inter)
df(inter)
df(local) df(inter)
Figure 3.2: An Atlas graph showing ﬂow of data to and from the DIGEST_ALGORITHM ﬁeld.
Atlas is useful for nearly any analysis task, but its fundamental use case is code comprehen-
sion. The precomputed relationships include suﬃcient material for building call graphs, data
ﬂow graphs, type hierarchies, dependency graphs, and many other useful results. A number of
out-of-the-box scripts are provided for common queries. These lightweight analyses are invoked
automatically in Eclipse Smart Views as the user clicks on code artifacts, providing instant
feedback and interactive software graph visualizations. Figure 3.2 shows an example data ﬂow
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graph produced when the user clicks on the ﬁeld DIGEST_ALGORITHM . It shows the
ﬁeld deﬁnition, plus that part of the data ﬂow graph which is reachable via forward and reverse
traversals on data ﬂow relationships. The declaring control ﬂow, method, class, package and
project artifacts are shown automatically to provide visual context. In addition to Smart Views,
Atlas provides an Interpreter View which allows the user to make on-the-ﬂy queries using a pro-
vided API. These code comprehension features of Atlas are ideal for development, code reviews,
bug reports, software audits, documentation, managerial review, and much more.
In addition to its out-of-the-box functionality, Atlas provides a rich API for writing custom
analyzers. The library provides capabilities for selecting, traversing, and showing subgraphs
from the larger software graph. Figure 3.3 shows a short Atlas script which would produce
the data ﬂow graph shown in Figure 3.2. The scope of possible analysis use cases is bounded
only by the creativity of the user. For example, a script which performs global type inference,
re-resolves dynamic dispatches, and modiﬁes the graph database to reﬂect the results can be
written with only a few hundred lines of Atlas code! We describe two real-world analysis appli-
cations, verifying safe synchronization in Linux and detecting malware in Android applications,
in Sections 3.5 and 3.4, respectively.
Q ﬁeld = ﬁelds(DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
Q df = edges(Edge.DATA_FLOW);
Q result = df.forward(ﬁeld).union(df.reverse(ﬁeld));
show(result);
Figure 3.3: An example Atlas script which would produce the graph shown in Figure 3.2.
3.3 Design & Architecture
Atlas is available today as a plugin for the popular Eclipse IDE. It is architected to achieve
several design goals:
1. Provide suﬃcient material to solve diﬃcult analysis problems.
2. Provide lightweight built-in analyses which scale to millions of lines of code.
3. Enable both automation and interaction.
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To provide suﬃcient analysis materials, Atlas employs a number of polynomial time static
analyzers to index an attributed, directed graph representation of the program's Abstract Syntax
Tree. The nodes in the graph are software artifacts, and the edges are relationships between
the artifacts. Each node or edge contains a set of tags and a map of attributes which contain
additional information about that element (eg the local alias of the object instance in use).
Suﬃcient raw material is provided to solve arbitrary analysis problems. Table 3.1 shows a
high-level view of the artifact types and relationships that Atlas currently indexes.
Table 3.1: Artifacts and relationships in Atlas graphs.
Nodes PROJECT, PACKAGE, CLASS, INTERFACE, ENUM, ANNOTATION, PARAMETER,
FIELD, ENUMCONSTANT, DATA_FLOW, METHOD, CONTROL_FLOW, INVOKE
Edges DECLARES, ANNOTATION, ELEMENTTYPE, OVERRIDES, PARAM, RETURNS,
SUPERTYPE, THROWS_CLAUSE, TYPEOF, CALL, INVOKE, CAST, CATCH,
CATCH, THROW, READ, WRITE
To achieve scalability, Atlas indexes all of the necessary raw material, but only precomputes
a ﬁrst approximation of relationships. For example, when encountering a method invocation rep-
resenting a dynamic dispatch, Atlas conservatively indexes CALL edges to all possible method
targets. This ﬁrst approximation allows Atlas to avoid doing the heavy lifting necessary for
global type inference, keeps the indexing process fast, and may be good enough to satisfy most
use cases. However, if the user really does want to do global type inference to tighten this
approximation, he or she can do so by writing an Atlas script. This philosophy allows Atlas to
index millions of lines of code in minutes and avoid unnecessary work.
Automation and interaction are provided via multiple Eclipse views. Atlas provides a Smart
View, which allows for immediate analysis results to be shown to the user in response to clicks
on software elements. Atlas also provides an Interpreter View, which allows the user to
compose on-the-ﬂy queries in a Scala interpreter environment and show results in an Eclipse
graph editor. In both cases, the graph layout is customizable, and clicking on graph elements
brings the user directly to the corresponding code locations. The Interpreter also allows the
user to invoke automated scripts from a special project in the workspace, called a toolbox. In
Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we describe the use of toolbox projects to perform custom analyses.
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3.4 Malware Detection Study
Analysis problems which require high-speciﬁc domain knowledge are a natural reason to
extend the capabilities of Atlas. Consider the problem of detecting novel malicious behavior in
Android applications, as in DARPA's Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity (APAC)
program. Iowa State University is a performer on the project, using Atlas as the foundation of
its approach. In order to detect malice, we must ﬁrst deﬁne what it means for a behavior to be
malicious. Unfortunately, this depends on the purpose of the app. For example, it is expected
for a navigation app to send the device location to the Internet, but that is unexpected for a
podcast player.
Human judgment is required to determine the legitimacy of a behavior, so fully automated
detection of malware is not possible. Instead, we seek to amplify the natural intelligence and
intuitions of the human analyst by providing the ISU Security Toolbox, an analysis suite built
on top of Atlas. The Toolbox contains Atlas scripts which detect smelly software patterns,
such as reﬂectively calling private library methods and dynamic code loading. We also provide
parameterized detection scripts which locate violations of the well-known CIA (Conﬁdentiality,
Integrity, Availability) security model. The analyst pre-encodes his domain knowledge of what
is security-relevant for a particular application, and the Toolbox runs the selected scripts and
parameters in an automated way. After the results are aggregated, the analyst systematically
reviews them. An overview of the approach is shown in Figure 3.4.
In the ISU approach, the human provides the creativity and insight, while Atlas performs
the mechanical burden of ﬁnding the requested behaviors. As with synchronization veriﬁcation,
Atlas frees the ISU analyst to focus on the problem domain. Meanwhile, the analyst provides
key insights and domain knowledge that Atlas, by itself, is lacking. In the ﬁrst four APAC
experiments, we analyzed a mix of 76 malicious and benign challenge applications provided by
the adversarial challenge performers. To date, we correctly classiﬁed 90% of the apps, with an
average analysis time of 2 hours. These results exceed those of any other APAC performer.
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Figure 3.4: ISU detects novel malware using Atlas.
3.5 Linux Synchronization Study
In Section 3.4 we described the semi-automated task of detecting novel malware, which
begins by understanding an app's purpose. Consider a more concrete problem which lends
itself more naturally to automation. Many important software properties can be modeled as
two-event problems, wherein we wish to verify that event B follows event A on all possible
execution paths. Examples include allocation and deallocation for memory management and
locking and unlocking for safe synchronization. In our group's prior work, we employ a version of
Atlas for the C programming language to verify the latter property in the Linux 2.6.31 kernel,
where the two events correspond to calls to mutex_lock() and mutex_unlock(). Taking full
advantage of the Atlas man + machine philosophy, we successfully demonstrate the correctness
of synchronization in Linux. [75]
Let us refer to a locking event on mutex signature X as L(X), and the unlocking event as
U(X). To show that U(X) follows L(X) on every execution path, we must demonstrate that all
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paths along which a violation may occur are infeasible. At ﬁrst, the problem appears to be
intractable due to the exponential number of execution paths. However, we observe that the
number of ways in which U(X) may follow L(X) is limited:
1. U(X) follows L(X) within the same function.
2. Token X is passed on the stack as a parameter to the forward call graph, which performs
U(X).
3. Token X is returned on the stack to the reverse call graph, which performs U(X).
4. Token X is written to a global variable and is later read to perform U(X).
The ﬁrst scenario is trivial to check, the second and third are a bit more complex, and the
fourth is the worst case. If Linux is well-designed, we hypothesize that scenarios 1-3 are the
prevailing pattern. Our analysis begins by using Atlas to locate all L(X) and U(X) events in
the kernel. We utilize a custom Atlas script to automatically discharge the simple scenarios
from category 1. Next, we develop the notion of a Matching Pair Graph (MPG(X)). MPG(X)
encapsulates categories 2-4 to provide the minimal subset of the kernel's call graph which must
be considered to verify a locking scenario. We compute MPG(X) for all X automatically using
an Atlas script. For a more about MPG(X), see [75].
We observe that the average MPG(X) in Linux 2.6.31 contains only 8 functions, and the
majority of cases are, in fact, smaller. Only 3 of the 249 scenarios have a size above 50 functions.
We also observe that MPG(X) reduces the size of the event RCG that must be considered by an
average of 56%, with reductions as high as 99%. From MPG(X), the relevant interprocedural
control ﬂow graph can be automatically generated. In later work we reﬁne this notion further
by using Atlas to compute an Event Flow Graph (EFG), which discards irrelevant branch
conditions of the CFG by retaining only the governing conditions which may aﬀect the two-
event property. To accomplish this, Atlas is used to perform a series of graph transformations to
the CFG, shown in Figure 3.5. We ﬁnd that the EFG is often 80-90% smaller than the original
CFG. [2]
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Figure 1: Examples of graph transformations
2. Graph Transformations
Computing the trace content of a flow graph G can be simplified if the size
of G can be reduced while preserving it’s trace content. Motivated by this we
describe the following graph transformations.
Type T1: Transformation T1 on G removes a self-loop on an unimportant
node.
Clearly, T1 does not change the trace content of G. Figure 1a exemplifies T1.
Type T2: Let e1 and e2 be two parallel edges. Transformation T2 on G deletes
e2.
Clearly, T2 does not change the trace content of G. Figure 1b exemplifies T2.
Type T3: Transformation T3 on G acts on an unimportant node u having all
the out-going edges ending in a common node v by deleting all the outgoing edges
of u and identifying u into v. Specifically, it does the following:
1. For every edge e = (t, u), delete e and add edge (t, v) to G.
2. Delete u from G.
Clearly, T3 does not change the trace content of G. Figure 1c exemplifies T3.
Transformation T3 can be generalized to a subgraph S of G induced by the unim-
portant nodes such that all edges from S to G−S end in a common node m. That
is, there exists a node m ∈ {VG \ VS} such that for every edge (u, v) in S, v is in
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Figure 3.5: Graph transformations used to reduce a CFG into an EFG.
The use of Atlas to verify safe synchronization in Linux is a perfect example of the potency
of the man + machine philosophy. The automation features of Atlas can be used to discharge
simple cases. For the remaining cases, automation can be used to compute MPG(X) and EFG.
From an EFG, we are able to discharge the vast majority of potential synchronization scenarios
in a fully-automated fashion. We are left with a tractable number of complex synchroniza-
tion scenarios which require human insight to check. The quantity of original synchronization
scenarios makes manual analysis intractable, while the complexity of the remaining few scenar-
ios makes automated analysis intractable. Our man + machine hybrid system combines the
strengths of both approaches to solve the problem in its entirety.
3.6 Conclusion
Atlas is a powerful new software analysis platform. It can be used out-of-the-box to facilitate
rapid code comprehension, and it can be extended with toolbox projects to create custom
analysis tools. We describe two such custom use cases in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, and the success
results of each. Our ICSE 2014 demonstration will explore the code comprehension and malware
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analysis use cases. By embracing the Fred Brooks hypotheses [88], Atlas brings feasibility to
diﬃcult analysis problems which are resistant to manual eﬀort or automation alone.
3.7 Appendix5
3.7.1 Personal Contributions
As the paper notes, Atlas is a commercial product made by EnSoft Corp. EnSoft was an
ISU subcontractor during the APAC project; from 2011 to 2015, I worked closely with EnSoft
to evolve and shape Atlas to ﬁt our needs. This collaboration included feedback and requests
for the software graph schema, new and existing query APIs, bug reports, and much more. I
interned at EnSoft during the Summer of 2012. During my internship I added new APIs for
graph modiﬁcation and transformation. I was not one of the original Atlas developers, but I
have done a great deal to shape its direction.
3.7.2 Post-Publication Changes
Atlas continued to evolve after this paper was published in 2014. The largest change relates
to the software graph schema Atlas is transitioning to the eXtensible Common Software
Graph (XCSG)[105] schema. During our participation on APAC, the schema evolved in an
iterative fashion to meet our needs for writing novel security analyzers for Java programs. As
APAC came to a close, there was a need to redesign the schema in a more systematic and
rigorous way. Compared to the graph schema used during APAC, XCSG oﬀers the following
advantages:
 Well-deﬁned semantics. In the past, an Atlas tag had occasionally-ambiguous seman-
tics. For example, the tag corresponding to the abstract Java keyword meant something
diﬀerent when applied to a type than when it was applied to a method. In XCSG, such
tags have been subdivided so that each tag has unique semantics.
 Properly-abstracted hierarchy. As a consequence of well-deﬁned semantics, relation-
ships exposed by XCSG have been organized into a disciplined hierarchy of proper ab-
5 Not included in the original publication.
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stractions. In the past, more than one node kind could appear at the origin or destination
of a single edge kind; this is no longer the case. Every edge kind in XCSG has unique
origin and destination node types, which are well-documented.
 Support for several languages. Atlas currently has support for Java, Jimple, C,
and C++. In order to write analyzers that will work across programming languages,
common semantics among languages have been abstracted in XCSG. As an example, we
recently implemented the algorithm proposed by the University of Peking for detecting
natural and reducible loops in arbitrary CFGs. Because our implementation relies upon
the high-level abstractions of XCSG, it works for Java, Jimple, C, and C++. The ability
to write a static analyzer that is portable across several programming languages is, to our
knowledge, completely novel. This idea should help to usher a new paradigm of write
once, run everywhere static analysis tools.
Other changes since ICSE 2014 include:
 Support for Java bytecode. During APAC, Atlas was able to index and analyze
Java source code, but not byte code. Since APAC, Atlas has added the ability to
convert Android APKs (containing Dalvik class ﬁles) and JAR archives (containing JVM
class ﬁles) to Jimple, a portable intermediate bytecode language, using Soot[95]. Indexing
support for Jimple has been added. I employed these new capabilities to implement
FlowMiner, which is discussed in Chapter 5.
 Enhanced support for C and C++.
3.7.3 Tools and Documentation
At the time of this writing, the current version of Atlas was 2.1.7. Atlas is available for
download from EnSoft Corp, with free academic and trial licenses available:
http://www.ensoftcorp.com/atlas/
36
More information about the eXtensible Common Software Graph (XCSG) schema can be
found at:
http://ensoftatlas.com/wiki/Extensible_Common_Software_Graph
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CHAPTER 4. SECURITY TOOLBOX FOR DETECTING NOVEL AND
SOPHISTICATED MALWARE
This paper has been accepted to ICSE and will be presented in June of 2015 in Florence, Italy
and published in the Companion Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Software
Engineering. Material in Section 4.9 has been added for this thesis and does not appear in the
original paper. This work addresses our second research question: How can a man-machine
analysis system detect novel, sophisticated, and domain-speciﬁc malware?
Benjamin Holland123, Tom Deering34, Suresh Kothari4
Abstract
This paper presents a demo of our Security Toolbox to detect novel malware in Android
apps. This Toolbox is developed through our recent research project funded by the DARPA
Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity (APAC) project. The adversarial challenge
("Red") teams in the DARPA APAC program are tasked with designing sophisticated malware
to test the bounds of malware detection technology being developed by the research and de-
velopment ("Blue") teams. Our research group, a Blue team in the DARPA APAC program,
proposed a human-in-the-loop program analysis approach to detect malware given the source
or Java bytecode for an Android app. Our malware detection apparatus consists of two compo-
nents: a general-purpose program analysis platform called Atlas, and a Security Toolbox
built on the Atlas platform. This paper describes the major design goals, the Toolbox com-
ponents to achieve the goals, and the workﬂow for auditing Android apps. The accompanying
1 Primary author 2 Author for correspondence 3 Primary researcher 4 Graduate student and advisor,
respectively. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
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video illustrates features of the Toolbox through a live audit.
Video: http://youtu.be/WhcoAX3HiNU
4.1 Introduction
Searching for novel malware can be like looking for a needle in the haystack, but without
knowing what a needle is or having ever seen one. In 2010 we learned of Stuxnet [97], a targeted
nation-state level attack against an Iranian nuclear research site. The attack was only detected,
some speculate intentionally, when it began to utilize noisy traditional attack vectors such as
USB malware propagation. Recently we have seen a proliferation of high-level logic bugs in
SSL [137, 138] and even a recently discovered 25-year-old logic bug in the Bash shell [139].
While most would agree that these bugs were honest mistakes, a few have speculated that some
may have been added with malicious intent [25]. Since we have no way to determine intent by
examining code a security analyst must consider software bugs as potential malice. In either
case the consequences can be catastrophic. When the stakes are high, the current practices
for malware detection are far from adequate. The DARPA APAC program aims at creating
new techniques and tools to detect sophisticated Android malware capable of causing serious
damage in a Department of Defense scenario.
USAF Colonel John Boyd described the OODA loop as an iterative decision cycle of
observe, orient, decide, and act. Boyd developed this framework as a way to explain the unan-
ticipated, superior agility of US ﬁghter pilots in aerial combat situations. The paradigm of
OODA loops applies equally well to the APAC context. To detect malware, our tools must be
able to outmaneuver the capabilities of adversaries who will continue to develop new varieties
of Android malware. Our Security Toolbox for Android is designed to utilize best-in-class
automation and iteration techniques to maximize the odds of emerging victorious from this
confrontation. We completed Phase I of the DARPA APAC program as the top performing
Blue team.
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4.2 Design Goals
4.2.1 Minimizing Human Eﬀort
Goal: Minimize the human eﬀort for (a) cross-verifying automatically detected malware, (b)
performing what-if experiments to hypothesize, reﬁne, and postulate application-speciﬁc mal-
ware that is not on the radar of automated malware detection.
We incorporate a Query-Model-Reﬁne (QMR) program analysis platform, called Atlas [50,
48], developed by EnSoft; it provides the tool mechanics necessary for our human-in-the-loop
detection of malware. We use a heterogeneous, attributed, directed graph data structure as an
abstraction to represent the essential aspects of the program's syntax and semantics (structure,
control ﬂow, and data ﬂow), which are required to reason about software. Atlas constructs this
graph from a set of software projects provided by the user. Atlas oﬀers an expressive query
language for users to write composable analyzers. Analyzers compute results in the form of
subgraphs relevant to the query (evidence), which can be visualized. Based on the evidence,
users can issue further queries, possibly involving information beyond speciﬁc program artifacts
(e.g., looking for a speciﬁc URL). The above iteration continues until the user is satisﬁed with
the analysis. The Security Toolbox includes analyzers using the Atlas query language.
These analyzers incorporate Android semantics and they can be invoked programmatically or
through interactive Smart Views, described in Section 4.4.5.
4.2.2 Incorporating Android Semantics
Goal: Incorporate rich and complex semantics that Android provides to facilitate development
of mobile apps.
To address the semantics of Android, the Security Toolbox incorporates the permission
mapping between Android APIs and the permissions each API requires. The Toolbox also
incorporates semantics of fundamental Android components such as Activities, Services, Content
providers, and Broadcast receivers5, as well as Android speciﬁc XML resources6.
5 https://developer.android.com/guide/components/fundamentals.html
6 https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/resources/providing-resources.html
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We have developed new algorithms to automatically summarize all the Android APIs. This
is work in progress and when completed we will incorporate these summaries in our Toolbox
and also make them available to others in a portable format.
4.2.3 Evolution and User-friendly Design
Goal: Develop a detection tool that is evolution-friendly and highly usable.
We have a decoupled architecture to achieve this goal. The malware detection capability is
decoupled and built on top of the program analysis platform (Atlas). The underlying design
philosophy is similar to platforms like Matlab or Mathematica with domain-speciﬁc toolboxes
built on top of general-purpose machinery. The low-level static analysis resides inside Atlas, and
the malware detection capability resides inside the Toolbox as analyzers using Atlas queries.
Reﬁning and extending the existing detection capabilities as well as creating entirely new ca-
pabilities is relatively easy because it can all be done through query-enabled analyzers. Since
creating a complete list of malware properties is unrealistic, it is imperative that it be rela-
tively simple to expand the cookbook of ready-made properties through the use of adversarial
thinking.
4.3 Use Cases for the Security Toolbox
The Security Toolbox is useful for nearly any Android malware detection task, with
three main use cases described as follows:
 Automated detection of Android malware that has a clearly deﬁned speciﬁcation
 Production of evidence to support conclusions of automated analysis
 Enabling the human to perform what-if experiments to hypothesize and detect new mal-
ware that cannot be detected automatically because its pattern or speciﬁcation is not
known a priori
4.4 Components
The Security Toolbox is logically separated into several components as detailed below.
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4.4.1 Permission Mapping
Android's sensitive functionalities such as sending and receiving text messages, accessing
geo-location information, or accessing user contacts are protected by runtime checks that en-
force whether or not an application has been granted permission to invoke such functionalities.
The Security Toolbox leverages the permission mapping produced by the Toronto PScout
research group [15]. For each API version of Android, we transform the PScout mapping to
an XML ﬁle that precisely represents the permission protected methods. The Toolbox contains
code for parsing an Application's manifest, and uses the XML ﬁle to automatically annotate
the correct API mapping onto the Atlas program graph. We have automatically scraped and
encoded into Java objects the Google developer documentation for permissions, permission
groups, and protection levels to aid in developing analyzers. Additionally we have recovered
mappings for Android permissions to protection levels, and permissions to permission groups
by mining their relationships from the Android source7.
4.4.2 Indexers
The Atlas program graph provides much of the information needed to analyze programs,
but some information is a conservative estimate. One example is type inference where the
dynamic dispatch edges may be conservatively resolved to many potential targets. To address
this problem, the Security Toolbox implements a Rapid Type Analysis (RTA) [22] strategy
to exclude call edges to methods that should not be possible at runtime based on observed
constructor calls. The Type Inference Indexer performs the RTA analysis and annotates the
edges in the program graph for use by other analyzers. Since Android makes extensive use of
XML for its user interface, manifest, and other resources many important program artifacts
are missing in the Java program graph produced by Atlas. The Security Toolbox provides
indexers to annotate and add missing program elements from these resources to the Atlas
program graph.
7 https://github.com/EnSoftCorp/android-essentials-toolbox
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1 Q declaresEdges = universe.edgesTaggedWithAny(Edge.DECLARES).retainEdges ();
2 Q callEdges = universe.edgesTaggedWithAny(Edge.CALL).retainEdges ();
3 Q overridesEdges = universe.edgesTaggedWithAny(Edge.OVERRIDES).retainEdges ();
4 Q abortBroadcast = methodSelect("BroadcastReceiver", "abortBroadcast").union(
methodSelect("PendingResult", "abortBroadcast"));
5 abortBroadcast = abortBroadcast.union(overridesEdges.reverse(abortBroadcast));
6 Q onReceive = methodSelect("BroadcastReceiver", "onReceive");
7 onReceive = onReceive.union(overridesEdges.reverse(onReceive));
8 Q highPriorityTypes = context.nodesTaggedWithAny(AndroidManifest.MANIFEST_HIGH_PRIORITY.
toString ());
9 Q highPriorityOnReceive = onReceive.intersection(declaresEdges.forward(highPriorityTypes
));
10 Q highPriorityBroadcastBlockers = callEdges.between(highPriorityOnReceive ,
abortBroadcast);
Listing 4.1: Analyzer queries to ﬁnd high priority broadcast blockers
4.4.3 Analyzers
The Security Toolbox deﬁnes an Analyzer Interface that encapsulates the logic for
traversing a program graph to extract an "envelope" (a subgraph that is either empty if the
security property is satisﬁed or non-empty containing the necessary information to locate the
violation of the security property). Analyzers encapsulate their descriptions, assumptions, and
possible continuations to reﬁne results or broaden a traversal. For example, one possible con-
tinuation for a data ﬂow based taint analysis between a sensitive source and a sensitive sink
that produced a graph that is too large to interpret would be to perform the same taint analysis
with call, object, type, and ﬂow sensitivities enabled. Analyzers have been subdivided into
property, smell, conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability analyzers. A property is something
the analyst should be aware of, but does not necessarily indicate malice, such as uses of native
code. A smell is a heuristic similar to a property that indicates a stronger suspicion, which
demands a justiﬁcation such as using Java reﬂection to invoke a private API. The conﬁdential-
ity, integrity, and availability (CIA) analyzers detect violations of CIA properties using taint
analysis of sources and sinks, modiﬁcation operations on sensitive mutables, and loop detection
of expensive resources respectively.
Listing 4.1 shows the queries an analyzer could use to detect high priority broadcast blockers,
which could be used to intercept and block SMS messages on an Android device. Lines (1-3)
select DECLARES, CALL, and OVERRIDES subgraphs; (4-5) selects abortBroadcast methods
including overridden methods; (6-7) selects BroadcastReciever onReceive methods including
overridden methods; (8) selects classes registered with a high priority in the Android manifest;
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Figure 4.1: Security Toolbox Dashboard Interface
(9) selects high priority onReceive methods; (10) selects CALL graphs that have an edge between
the high priority onReceive methods and abortBroadcast methods.
4.4.4 Dashboard
The Dashboard (shown in Figure 4.1) is an interface for automating the execution and
managing results of the Toolbox's automated analyzers. The Dashboard accounts for analyzer
dependencies to enable the highest amount of parallel computation while running a multitude
of analyzers. As results are computed, they are presented to the analyst in the work item queue
on the right of the Dashboard. Results can be ﬁltered by category and marked as reviewed.
Optionally an analyst can make additional notes on a work item. Since work items correspond to
subgraphs of the program graph, they can be named and even colored to help identify separate
program subsystems. Program artifacts can be manually added or removed from a work item
based on the colors given to program artifacts.
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Figure 4.2: Smart View showing reverse data ﬂow into Android XML resources from selected
ﬁeld
4.4.5 Smart Views
Smart Views are developed from the observation that there are several graph traversal
queries that analysts use over and over again during audits, such as forward and reverse control
and data ﬂows, or discovering the declarative structures and instantiations of an object. To
speed up such tasks, a graph for each of these queries can be automatically generated in response
to mouse selection events on relevant source code or existing graph components. Smart Views
can be customized for particular Android-speciﬁc analysis tasks, such as showing user interface
XML button event callbacks.
Figure 4.2 shows a customized Smart View showing a reverse data ﬂow program slice that
includes program artifacts in the Android XML resources. The graph got generated when the
user clicked on the "destination" ﬁeld in the source window to inspect its value.
4.5 Workﬂow
The workﬂow of an audit follows a comprehension-driven model of an iterative Observe-
Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) decision loop. An audit starts by running the Dashboard, which
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produces evidence for the human analyst to inspect. This information helps the analyst observe
program behaviors and orient that information within the context of the application. Aided by
this information, the analyst can prioritize his exploratory hypotheses to discover malice. To
aid in testing a hypothesis, Smart Views are used to quickly follow control and data ﬂows or
perform a targeted analysis such as a symbolic analysis, Android Intent resolution, or matching
exception throw and catch sites. Conﬁrming a hypothesis either results in the discovery of
malware or results in more hypotheses to explore, which begins the process anew. If a hypothesis
set becomes depleted an audit is halted, and audits of remaining applications are reprioritized.
Finally, after the discovery of malware, the Security Toolbox is adapted by writing new
analyzers to raise the bar for future automated analysis.
4.6 Evaluation
By the end of Phase I of the DARPA APAC project, our team audited 77 Android appli-
cations developed by the Red team, of which 62 contained novel malware able to evade current
automatic detection techniques. DARPA employed a control team to use current state of the
art tools to audit the apps along side Blue team performers. Our process correctly classiﬁed 66
(85.7%) apps as malicious or benign, found unintended malicious behaviours in 6 (7.8%) apps,
and missed malware in only 5 (6.5%) of the apps consistently beating the control team. We
completed Phase I as the top performing Blue team.
4.7 Related Work
A number of tools and techniques have been developed for detecting malware in Android
apps including some based on static analysis [70, 113, 143, 153, 63, 1] and those based on
dynamic analysis [59, 121]. These automated detection methods fall into two general categories:
1) signature-based and 2) machine learning-based. Signature-based approaches can be easily
evaded by bytecode-level transformation attacks. Learning based approaches extract features
from application syntax, rather than program semantics, and are also subject to evasion.
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Berkeley [65] was the ﬁrst to mine a mapping between Android permissions and the corre-
sponding permission protected APIs using a dynamic analysis approach to randomly call APIs.
Toronto later improved on Berkeley's incomplete mapping with a quicker, less involved, static
analysis approach that mined complete public and private API mappings from the Android
source code [15]. Our Toolbox incorporates the Toronto mapping.
4.8 Conclusion
Our novel human-in-loop approach to detect Android malware minimizes human eﬀort by
allowing the human to use the evidence produced by the machine to focus their eﬀort on further
machine-assisted reasoning. This aﬀords greater opportunity to detect malware that is not on
the radar of an automated analyzer; the what-if experimentation capability provided by the
machine enables the user to posit attacker intentions, hypothesize about the attacker's modus
operandi and tailor queries to detect sophisticated malware. Thus, our approach increases
automation, reduces human eﬀort and error, and provides valuable machine assistance to detect
novel and sophisticated malware.
This demo paper describes the Security Toolbox that implements our novel approach.
The accompanying video shows a live audit that brings out various features of the Toolbox
including the Dashboard (to run and manage automated analyzers), Permission Usage View (to
list permissions and where they are used in the app), and Smart Views (to facilitate what-if
experiments). We acknowledge the valuable feedback from our reviewers of this paper. Several
components of the Security Toolbox are being open sourced under the MIT License at
https://github.com/EnSoftCorp.
4.9 Appendix8
4.9.1 Personal Contributions
The Security Toolbox was a joint research eﬀort by our team at ISU and our subcon-
tractor, EnSoft Corp. As a member of the APAC project from its inception, I have had a
8 Not included in the original publication.
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major inﬂuence on its development. Colleague Ben Holland and I were the primary develop-
ers, writing the vast majority of the code that composes the Security Toolbox. I wrote
critical and complex components, including an indexer for Android XML resources, a symbolic
value analysis engine, a software graph alignment engine, and a state-of-the-art iterative type
inference engine. I also wrote a large number of the malware detection scripts themselves.
In addition to spearheading the implementation of the Security Toolbox, I helped to
develop, implement, and evaluate its human-in-the-loop philosophy for malware detection. I
participated as an analyst during the APAC malware detection experiments, using the Secu-
rity Toolbox to ﬁnd, understand, and report sophisticated and novel malware. Most of the
iterative improvements were directly informed by our experiences during these experiments.
4.9.2 Noteworthy Unpublished Accomplishments
This subsection provides details about some impressive, though unpublished, engineering
tooling that I created while developing the Security Toolbox.
4.9.2.1 Indexer for Android XML Resources
Android encourages developers to make heavy use of resource XML ﬁles when designing
an application. Rather than deﬁning things like UI layouts and string constants in Java, it is
recommended for these elements to be codiﬁed in XML and separated from the core application
logic. In this way, Android can automatically select the proper layout ﬁle for the given device
size and orientation, the proper localized strings for the user's language, etc. At runtime, an
application can reference XML resources using automatically-generated identiﬁers, and XML
can also reference Java program elements (for example, to name the callback that should be
invoked when a button is pressed).
This paradigm presents a problem for static program analysis tools that operate on Java
source or byte code, because important program elements are external to these artifacts. To
address this problem, I created an XML Resource Indexer to parse and interpret XML, inserting
supplementary nodes and edges into the Atlas program graph. With this added representation
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1 public class ClassWithValues {
2 String suffix = "." + "c" + "o" + "m";
3 String res = prefix () + "evil" + suffix;
4 String prefix (){
5 return "www.";
6 }
7 }
Listing 4.2: Malicious Android app using AsyncTask library class to leak data.
of XML resources, we were able to develop analyzers with complete knowledge of both the Java
and XML portions of an app.
4.9.2.2 Value Analysis Framework
For program analysis tasks, including malware detection, we must often answer questions
such as Where can value V appear in the program?, and What values can appear at point P in
the program? During APAC, answers to these questions were critical; without them, we could
not reliably or automatically determine:
 The destinations of Intent objects
 The contents of URLs, UI labels, and other strings
 The targets of reﬂective accesses
 Important value parameters of sensitive API calls
 ... much more
To solve this problem, I created a core library of the Security Toolbox called ValueUtils.
ValueUtils allows a program data ﬂow graph to be executed symbolically so that potential
values can be determined. Figure 4.3 illustrates this symbolic execution for the program in
Listing 4.2. The example shows the symbolic reconstruction of a malicious URL value that is
dynamically-assembled by the application.
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of Security Toolbox value analysis framework used to resolve the
malicious URL in the program from Listing 4.2
While symbolic value analysis is not an academically-novel concept, the creation of a value
analysis library for the Security Toolbox was a critical step forward for our participation
in APAC, and enabling both automated and interactive queries value-based queries.
4.9.2.3 Type-Sensitive Global Type Inference
There are two kinds of function invocations in most programming languages. Static function
calls have targets that are known at compile time and can be explicitly addressed in the compiled
binary. Virtual function calls, known in Java as dynamic dispatches, require runtime information
to dynamically-compute the target of a call. In a language like C, this runtime information would
be the value of a dereferenced function pointer. In Java, this information is the runtime type
of the object upon which a call is made.
Since references in Java (and most languages) can have declared types that are more general
than their runtime types, dynamic dispatches present a challenge for constructing sound call
graphs. One safe approach is to over-approximate and compute the set of all possible targets.
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1 Let DF be initialized to sound (non -dispatch) data flow edges
2 Let TYPES map be initialized for new statements , references to final types
3 Initialize FRONTIER to references with types (new and final from above)
4
5 While element FROM exists on the FRONTIER
6 Pop FROM from the FRONTIER
7 For each outgoing edge in DF
8 Let TO be recipient element
9
10 If TO is a cast
11 Add TO to next frontier iff >=1 compatible TYPES(FROM) added to TYPES(TO)
12 Else
13 Add TO to next frontier iff >=1 TYPES(FROM) added to TYPES(TO)
14
15 If TYPES(TO) was updated and is "this."
16 Recompute dispatch for corresponding callsite
17 Add new edges to DF
Listing 4.3: Pseudocode for a ﬁxed-point, type-sensitive global type inference algorithm.
This is the default approach taken by Atlas and many other tools. Unfortunately, an unsound
call graph leads to subsequent analyses that produce many false positives. This is because the
conservative set of possible targets is usually much larger than the feasible set at runtime.
To compute a tighter and more accurate call graph, we require type inference, a technique for
inferring the much smaller set of feasible runtime types for each object reference. Type inference
works by starting from the type information we know (new statements) and propagates that
information forward to infer types of other references. I implemented the state-of-the-art global
type inference algorithm shown in Listing 4.2 to do this for the Security Toolbox. The
algorithm maintains a frontier of nodes in the data ﬂow graph with new type information to
communicate to successor nodes. This type information is iteratively propagated forward along
sound data ﬂow edges. When new type information reaches a dynamic dispatch call site, the
new target (if any) is computed, and new data ﬂow edges are added to the sound edge set. The
algorithm terminates when it reaches a ﬁxed point (type information has been fully-propagated).
This approach is the current state-of-the-art for global type inference in the literature.
4.9.2.4 Software Graph Alignment
There are many reasons why one might wish to align (determine an equivalence mapping
between) two software graphs (shown in Figure 4.4), including smart diﬀerencing, plagiarism
and clone detection, etc. On the APAC project, we had at least two motivations for this
capability. First, given two versions of an application, we wanted to be able to scrutinize the
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semantic diﬀerences between them. Second, we wanted to be able to identify the public API
surface of Android from within the larger program graph of its full implementation, for the
purposes of developing FlowMiner.
Figure 4.4: Alignment of two software graphs
To address these needs, I created a software graph alignment algorithm for the Security
Toolbox. It consists of (i) a parallelized graph diﬀerencing algorithm, and (ii) a set of
matching rules describing how to compare two Java software graphs. Graph diﬀerencing is an
extremely well-studied topic; nevertheless, this work was a major engineering feat that was
crucial for achieving our goals on the APAC program.
4.9.3 Tools and Documentation
The various Security Toolbox components are currently under the process of being
selectively open-sourced. In an eﬀort to avoid training malware authors, we are reviewing our
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tooling prior to public release. Those components that have been released already can be found
at:
https://github.com/EnSoftCorp
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CHAPTER 5. FLOWMINER: AUTOMATIC EXTRACTION OF
LIBRARY DATA-FLOW SEMANTICS FOR PARTIAL PROGRAM
ANALYSIS
We are in the process of submitting an abbreviated version of this paper to the 30th
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering. We also plan to
submit a longer version of this paper with enhanced empirical evaluation and discussion as a
journal publication. Material in Section 5.11 has been added for this thesis and will not appear
in the published papers. This work addresses our third research question: How can expres-
sive, compact information ﬂow summaries be mined from a library for accurate
and scalable partial program analysis?
Tom Deering1234, Ganesh Ram Santhanam1, Suresh Kothari4
Abstract
Static program analysis tools are critical to the ﬁeld of software engineering, allowing us to
compile, refactor, verify, and understand our code. Because modern software is built on top
of reusable libraries and frameworks, whole program analysis is prohibitively expensive, hence
tools must instead perform partial program analysis- analysis of a proper subset of a program's
implementation. Missing data ﬂow semantics of these components introduce problematic gaps
for many use cases, including security-critical analyses. Prior attempts to overcome this, in-
cluding hand-written models, heuristics, and dynamically-inferred speciﬁcations, are too coarse
for many analysis use cases, introducing inaccuracies.
1 Primary author 2 Author for correspondence 3 Primary researcher 4 Graduate student and advisor,
respectively. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University.
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In this paper we propose FlowMiner, a tool to mine expressive data-ﬂow summaries from
Java library binaries to enable complete and accurate partial program analysis. We are the
ﬁrst to create ﬁne-grained summaries that can be used in a context, type, ﬁeld, object and
ﬂow-sensitive manner. We also emphasize compaction ﬂow details that are not critical for
accurate use are elided into simple edges between elements which are accuracy-critical. As
a result, summaries extracted by FlowMiner are an order of magnitude smaller than the
original library in size. The salient features of our technique are: (i) novel algorithms to extract
expressive, ﬁne-grained summary data ﬂow semantics from a Java library, (ii) compactness of
the summaries with respect to the original libraries, (iii) graph summarization paradigm that
uses a multi-attributed directed graph as the mathematical abstraction to store summaries, (iv)
open-source implementation (FlowMiner) of the above that saves summaries in a portable
format usable by existing analysis tools, and (v) validation of our work on some of the popular
Java libraries. We discuss the characteristics of our summaries versus those from other state-
of-the-art tooling. We also demonstrate that our work allows our existing analysis tools to
accurately handle previously unaddressed data ﬂows in Android applications.
Website: http://powerofpi.github.io/FlowMiner/
5.1 Introduction
Static analysis has emerged as a powerful paradigm [41, 107, 43] for the analysis of real world
software, as evidenced by the widespread use of static analysis tools in the government and in-
dustry. Despite their success, static analysis techniques share a common Achilles heel when it
comes to partial program analysis, i.e., the analysis of a proper subset of a program's implemen-
tation. Real-world software applications are built on top of reusable libraries and frameworks
(see Figure 5.1) that are often much larger than the applications which use them. For example,
Android applications are often three orders of magnitude smaller than the Android framework
itself. This makes whole program analysis, wherein such pieces would be included, infeasible.
Yet the alternative of excluding these components leads to unsound and/or incomplete results in
practice, which is unacceptable for safety and security critical analysis use cases (e.g., malware
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Figure 5.1: Partial program analysis omits reusable libraries and frameworks.
detection). Prior work to summarize library functions by relating inputs and outputs provides
a better alternative to excluding libraries from analysis of an application altogether; however
it is inadequate as it is too coarse (e.g., ﬂows to or from a ﬁeld in a class are counted as ﬂow
to or from the object.) to be used accurately in a future analysis. Hence, there is a pressing
need for algorithms and tools that compute ﬁne-grained and application-agnostic summaries of
a library's semantics in a way that can be reused in future analysis contexts.
In this work we present FlowMiner, a novel approach to extract ﬁne-grained yet com-
pact data ﬂow summaries from a library. We employ a graphical summarization paradigm
wherein summaries are expressed as multi-attributed directed graphs, which is much more ex-
pressive than coarse, binary relationships between inputs and outputs. FlowMiner extracts
application-agnostic summary data ﬂow graph semantics through a one-time analysis of library
bytecode. This summary is serialized in a portable format, and can be reused by existing
analysis tools to accurately and scalably analyze applications of interest.
Motivation. Our motivation for FlowMiner comes from a challenge we faced as participants
of DARPA's Automated Program Analysis for Cybersecurity (APAC) program, where we were
tasked with creating partial program analyses for Android apps to detect malware. The typ-
ical size of apps we were asked to analyze was small (1kLOC - 100kLOC). However, Android
apps are eﬀectively plugins to the much larger Android framework  Android 4.4.4 (KitKat)
contains over 2mLOC, which is orders of magnitude larger than the size of an app. Interaction
between apps and the framework is ubiquitous. For example, there are many information ﬂows
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that pass back and forth between the app and framework, often asynchronously, that must
be tracked to uncover possible malicious behaviors. Whole program analysis (including the
Android framework itself) solves the problem, but destroys scalability.
Optimizing Expressiveness and Compactness. When summarizing the data ﬂow seman-
tics of a library, certain key artifacts in the library will be crucial to its data ﬂow. For example,
individual ﬁeld deﬁnitions must be present if a summary is to be used in a ﬁeld-sensitive way,
and individual call sites must be preserved if library callbacks are to be captured. In Section 5.8,
for example, we empirically show that 93.07% of summarized ﬁeld ﬂows will be false positives
if ﬁeld deﬁnitions are not retained. Consequently, ﬁelds, method call sites, literal values, and
formal and informal method parameters and return values are all key artifacts of a ﬂow that
must be preserved in a summary data ﬂow.
On the other hand, non-key features such as uninteresting def-use chains of assignments
do not add value to the paths in which they participate, and can be abstracted away in the
summary. FlowMiner elides (replaces paths with direct edges) uninteresting ﬂow details
to arrive at an abstract data ﬂow graph that contains the key artifacts crucial to the data
ﬂow and reachability information between them, and is much more compact than the original
program graph. This allows us to achieve signiﬁcant savings and enhanced scalability versus
the original library, while preserving soundness. In other words, the ﬂows that are preserved
in FlowMiner's summary are precisely those that are actually possible at runtime. We ﬁnd
that our summaries only contain 26.89% of the nodes and 16.32% of the edges of the original
library program graphs, on average.
Contributions. In summary, the following are the contributions of this paper.
 We develop a static analysis technique to automatically generate ﬁne-grained, expressive
summary speciﬁcations given the source or bytecode of any Java library.
 Our algorithms identify and retain key artifacts of the program semantics necessary
to allow context, object, ﬂow, ﬁeld, and type-sensitive data ﬂow analyses in the future
when using our summaries.
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 Our summaries use a rich, multi-attributed graph as the mathematical abstraction
to encode ﬁne-grained summaries, rather than coarse binary relations between the
inputs and outputs of library API.
 The generated summaries are compact and signiﬁcantly smaller than the original
library, as non-key features in the ﬂows of the original library are elided into key
paths.
 We provide FlowMiner, an open-source reference implementation [49] of our algorithms
that extracts summaries given the source or bytecode of a library and exports them to a
portable, tool-agnostic format.
 We validate FlowMiner by demonstrating that our summaries of popular libraries are
much smaller than the original programs, yet more expressive and accurate than other
state-of-the-art summary techniques.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a motivating
example of an Android application whose malicious behavior cannot be detected without data
ﬂow semantics for the Android library. Section 5.3 provides background about Atlas, the
program analysis framework upon which FlowMiner is built. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 provide a
precise problem statement, notation, and high-level overview of our solution, while Section 5.6
discusses implementation details. Section 5.7 provides some thoughts, limitations, and discus-
sion of FlowMiner. We revisit our malicious Android app example, describing how summaries
from FlowMiner provide a solution to our problem. We evaluate and characterize our work
in Section 5.8, compare and contrast it with prior work in Section 5.9, and provide concluding
thoughts in Section 5.10.
5.2 Motivating Example
In this section, we put forward a motivating example of an Android application with a
malicious behavior that cannot be detected without summaries of library (Android) summary
data ﬂow semantics. This example is informed by our practical experiences designing tooling to
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1 public class MainActivity extends Activity {
2 private String deviceID;
3 private String simSerial;
4 private AsyncTask <String ,Void ,Void > at;
5
6 @Override
7 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
8 TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager) getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE)
;
9 deviceID = tm.getDeviceId ();
10 simSerial = tm.getSimSerialNumber ();
11
12 at = new AsyncTask <String ,Void ,Void >(){
13 @Override
14 protected Void doInBackground(String ... params) {
15 try {
16 String url = "http :// evil.com/";
17 for(String s : params){
18 url += "&" + s;
19 }
20 new URL(url).openConnection ();
21 } catch (IOException e) {}
22 return null;
23 }
24 };
25 }
26
27 @Override
28 protected void onPause (){
29 at.execute(deviceID , simSerial);
30 }
31 }
Listing 5.1: Malicious Android app that uses Android's AsyncTask library class to leak data
statically detect Android malware for DARPA's APAC program. While we illustrate the need to
summarize data ﬂow semantics of libraries using an Android example, this need arises in almost
every application that uses libraries. Therefore, our motivation should be considered a general
one, not limited to malware detection, Android, or even the Java programming language. The
techniques we propose in this paper are generic and widely-applicable.
Malicious App. Consider the Android app shown in Listing 5.1. MainActivity is a subclass
of Activity, so it deﬁnes an application screen. It overrides two lifecycle methods; the Android
framework will call onCreate when MainActivity is initialized for the ﬁrst time, and it will call
onPause when MainActivity loses user focus. Therefore, at some point when this app is run, there
will be a call to onCreate followed by a call to onPause. This triggers a latent malicious behavior.
Consider the onCreate method. On lines 9-10, the app retrieves the device ID and SIM card
serial number, writing them to member ﬁelds. Lines 12-24 deﬁne and instantiate an anonymous
AsyncTask, which is a threading mechanism deﬁned by the Android library. A call to
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AsyncTask.execute(params) causes Android to run the object's doInBackground(params) method in a
new thread, passing along the same arguments. Line 12 writes this anonymous AsyncTask object
to a member ﬁeld.
If we examine onPause(), we see that the AsyncTask is asynchronously executed with the device
ID and SIM card serial number as arguments. The doInBackground method constructs a shady URL
for a server operated by an attacker on lines 16-19, appending the sensitive information to the
URL. Line 20 opens a connection, causing an HTTP GET request to be issued to the malicious
server. This application behavior clearly will leak sensitive device data to http://evil.com.
Analysis Without Summaries. Consider how an analyst would hope to detect the malicious
ﬂow using a state-of-the-art static analysis tool. The analyst would ﬁrst deﬁne
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId and TelephonyManager.getSimSerialNumber to be sensitive information
sources, and any constructor of URL to be a sensitive information sink. The analyst would then
run a static analysis tool, hoping to detect data ﬂows from any of the sources to any of the
sinks. Figure 5.2 presents a software graph with the data ﬂows between the app and the Android
framework that will be tracked by a static analysis tool such as Atlas [50] (without access to
summaries of external library (Android) semantics). Observe that an Atlas-based analysis is
able to follow the data ﬂows from Android's
TelephonyManager into the onCreate method, then through member ﬁeld deﬁnitions, leading to the
parameters of a call to AsyncTask.execute5 (deﬁned by Android). At this point, the analyzer can
follow the ﬂow no further, as it has no information about the internal (private) implementation
of AsyncTask. In other words, the static analysis fails to detect the malicious data ﬂow because
data ﬂow semantics for the Android library are unavailable.
To solve this problem and identify the malicious ﬂow via static analysis, we either have
to (a) resort to whole-program analysis by including the entire Android implementation along
with the app as input to the static analyzer, which is prohibitively expensive for most real-world
libraries; or (b) include summary data ﬂow semantics for Android that precisely deﬁne the data
ﬂow information between Android components necessary to track data ﬂow through Android.
5 This partial ﬂow can be tracked by many state-of-the-art tools, including Atlas.
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Figure 5.2: Data ﬂows inferred by static analysis of a malicious app without Android semantics
fails to detect the malicious ﬂow (created by an Atlas script to follow data ﬂows forward to
detect source/sink ﬂows.)
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In this example, we require a summary of how data passed to AsyncTask.execute ﬂows through
the private implementation of Android and back into the app via an asynchronous callback.
In Section 5.4, we provide an overview of our solution for computing precise summaries of a
library. We perform an automatic, one-time extraction of summary data ﬂow semantics within
a given library (such as Android). We demonstrate how these summaries can be grafted into
the partial program analysis context, enabling us to detect the malicious program behavior
presented in the example above. The resolution of this example is described in Section 5.7.
5.3 Background: Atlas Program Analysis Platform
In this section, we provide the reader with background knowledge about the Atlas [50]
program analysis platform. Atlas is a static program analysis platform for C, Java source
code, and Java bytecode developed by EnSoft Corp, which can be used to develop custom and
sophisticated software analyzers [80]. Before we describe our approach to summary generation,
we brieﬂy describe the necessary infrastructure for developing FlowMiner that is provided
by Atlas. For the remainder of this paper, we assume the analysis of Java bytecode and use
terminology considered standard in the Java Language Speciﬁcation.
Atlas Program Graph. Given a program P, Atlas starts with the abstract syntax tree
(AST) and employs a number of polynomial-time static analyzers to construct a rich multi-
attributed software graph called the Atlas Program Graph (APG, denoted G(P)). Using at-
tributes, elements are arranged and expressed according to the eXtensible Common Software
Graph (XCSG) [105] schema. Software artifacts such as variables, parameters to a method, call
sites, classes, methods, etc. in P compose the nodes of the G(P), and relationships between
those artifacts are expressed as edges. XCSG expresses both structural relationships (contains,
overrides, extends, etc.) and runtime relationships (data ﬂow, call, control ﬂow, etc.) between
program artifacts. G(P) is compactly stored using an optimized in-memory graph database,
allowing for fast retrieval and traversal of artifacts. A subset of the important nodes and
structural edge kinds is shown in Figure 5.3.
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Nodes
 Project : Java project
 Library : Java library
 Method : Method of a class
 Type: Type deﬁnition
 Primitive: Primitive type
 Array Type: Array type
 Annotation: Annotation type
 Interface: Interface type
 Class: Class type
* Enum: Enum type
 Variable
 Field : Field of a type
 Parameter : Parameter of a method
 Identity : Implicit "this" parameter
 Return: Return value of a method
 Enum Constant : Constant enum value
 Local : Local variable
Structural Edges
 Declares: Origin declares dest
 Overrides: Origin method overrides dest method
 Supertype: Dest is a supertype of origin
 Extends: Origin extends dest
 Implements: Origin implements dest
 Typeof : Origin is of type dest
 Returns: Origin method return type is dest
 Element type: Type of array components
Tags
 Public: Public keyword
 Protected : Protected keyword
 Private: Private keyword
 Abstract : Abstract keyword
 Native: Native keyword
 Static: Static keyword
 Synchronized : Synchronized keyword
 Transient : Transient keyword
 Volatile: Volatile keyword
Attributes
 Name: Name of element
 Identiﬁer : Unique identiﬁer
 Parameter Index : Index of parameter in method
 Array Dimension: Dimension of array type
Figure 5.3: Subset of Atlas' eXtensible Common Software Graph (XCSG) schema.
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1 Q u = Common.universe ();
2 Q contains = u.edgesTaggedWithAny(XCSG.Contains);
3 Q methodDeclarations = contains.successors(u.nodesTaggedWithAny(XCSG.Method));
4 Q localTypes = methodDeclarations.nodesTaggedWithAny(XCSG.Type);
5 Q result = contains.forward(localTypes).nodesTaggedWithAny(XCSG.Parameter).selectNode(
XCSG.Name , "p");
Listing 5.2: Atlas script to ﬁnd parameters named "p" of methods of local types.
Attributes and Tags in G(P). Atlas graph elements contain tags (labels) and attributes
(properties). Atlas uses tags to express a hierarchy of node and edge kinds, a subset of which
appear in Figure 5.3, and also to communicate boolean properties, such as the presence or
absence of language keywords. Attributes express multi-valued properties of an element, such
as its name or parameter index, and thus provide a mechanism for ﬁltering results. A subset of
common attributes are also shown in Figure 5.3.
Querying G(P). Atlas provides a rich and expressive language to query G(P) with respect
to constraints on speciﬁc tags and attributes. One can develop custom scripts on top of Atlas
to select graph elements, traverse nodes and edges, and construct non-trivial subgraphs of
G(P) that reveal speciﬁc structural or behavioral aspects of P. Common tasks include the
computation of call graphs, control ﬂow graphs, data ﬂow graphs, and type hierarchies. More
exotic uses are also easy to encode; for example, one could identify the parameters named p
of methods of local types (types declared within a method) by selecting the nodes tagged as
methods, traversing forward on contains edges to ﬁnd local types and their declarations, ﬁltering
to nodes tagged as parameters, then ﬁltering by those whose name is p. This example script is
shown in Listing 5.2.
Queries can be issued in an interactive shell environment, or may be composed programmat-
ically using a Java API and packaged conveniently as Eclipse plugins. Intermediate and ﬁnal
script analysis results, which are subgraphs of G(P), can be conveniently visualized through an
Atlas graph editor view. The graph in Figure 5.2 is an example of a result shown in a graph
editor visualization. For more details on Atlas, its features and its query language, we refer
the reader to [50] and the online tutorial [79].
We use the program graph G(P) as a starting point to extract summaries. We then represent
the extracted summaries using an extension of the node and edge kinds in XCSG (to distinctly
64
represent summary ﬂows). The precomputed artifacts in G(P) that serve as raw material for
our summary extraction approach include:
 Program declarative structure
 Type hierarchy relationships (type points to a type it extends or implements)
 Method override relationships (method points to a method deﬁnition that it overrides)
 Static type relationships (variable points to its declared type)
 Call site information
 Method signature
 Type to search
 Informal parameters
 Pre-computed data ﬂow relationships (variable points to its ﬂow destination)
 Field reads and writes
 Local def-use chains
 Local array accesses
The algorithms for extracting data ﬂow summaries of a program P are described in the
following sections in terms of the program graph G(P) that Atlas provides.
5.4 Approach
In this section we provide a high-level overview of our novel approach to automatically-
extract summary library data ﬂow semantics. Our approach has the following desirable at-
tributes:
 Targets JVM bytecode for wide applicability
 Automatically extracts summaries without manual eﬀort
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 Retains details needed for context, object, ﬁeld, and type-sensitive use
 Uses portable encoding to allow use by any analysis tool
 Summaries are much smaller than a library itself
Notation. We introduce the following notation and concepts needed to explain the algorithmic
aspects of our approach. LetP be a program, andG(P) be its corresponding program graph pre-
processed by Atlas. Let M be the set of methods deﬁned in P. For each method mi ∈M let
the set Pi = {pi1, pi2 . . . pi|Pi|} denote the formal parameters to mi, and ri its return. We denote
a method call site by c := 〈mj , tc,Pc, rc〉 with Pc denoting the set of arguments (parameters
passed) from the call site c to mj and rc denoting the returned type from mj . tc denotes either
the Class where mj is deﬁned (if c is a static dispatch), or else the stated type of the reference on
which mj is invoked (if c is a dynamic dispatch). Statically-dispatched call sites do not require
runtime information to calculate the target of the call. These include calls to static methods
and constructors. Dynamically-dispatched call sites do require runtime information to calculate
the destination, as is the case for calls to general member methods.
Remark 1. An interesting case arises when an application deﬁnes a subtype of a library type
 this may introduce new potential runtime targets in the application for dynamic dispatch
call sites in the library (callbacks). For example, an application may deﬁne custom subkinds
of the java.util.List interface and pass instances of these types as parameters of calls to the
library. Hence, in order for the computed data ﬂow summaries of the library to be strictly
application-agnostic and complete, they cannot pre-resolve a dynamically-dispatched callsite a
priori. Our approach to computing data ﬂow summaries adheres to this principle, which we call
the open world assumption for computing summaries.
It is worth mentioning here that all the artifacts of the program P noted above are stored
explicitly, but compactly, in the program graph G(P) constructed by Atlas, and can be queried
via the Atlas API.
Illustration of Approach. To illustrate the approach taken to extract summaries from G(P),
consider the two methods, sum and average, deﬁned in Listing 5.3. A subset of theAtlas program
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1 static int average(List <Integer > l){
2 int lSum = sum(l);
3 int lLength = l.size();
4 return lSum / lLength;
5 }
6
7 static int sum(List <Integer > l){
8 int s = 0;
9 for(Integer i : l) s += i;
10 return s;
11 }
Listing 5.3: Malicious Android app using AsyncTask library class to leak data.
graph G(P) for the corresponding code is shown in Figure 5.4. Our goal is to arrive at the data
ﬂow summaries in Figure 5.5. Observe that the summary graph is derived from the original
program graph provided by Atlas; undistinguished nodes from G(P) are removed to simplify
the summary ﬂow semantics. However, the summary graph retains critical features of the ﬂows,
such as literal values, call sites, method signature elements, and the ﬂows between them.
To get from G(P) in Figure 5.4 to GS(P) in Figure 5.5, we perform the following high-level
steps:
1. Compute the program graph G(P)
2. Identify the set of key nodes in G(P) (highlighted in cyan in Figure 5.4)
3. Compute ﬂows between key nodes, eliding paths through non-key nodes into simple edges.
4. Compute inter-procedural summary ﬂows by analyzing callsites
There are important diﬀerences between G(P) and the summaries GS(P) that are produced.
Nodes in the program graph that are important or key features of a data ﬂow, such as formal
method parameters, method return nodes, and literal values, are all retained in the summary
graph. On the other hand, intermediate nodes and edges in the program graph between key
nodes are elided in the summary. For Listing 5.3, the key nodes for the program graph are
colored cyan in Figure 5.4. These are the nodes retained in the summary graph (Figure 5.5).
When intermediate nodes along a ﬂow from key node k1 to k2 are removed from the program
graph, a summary edge is introduced between k1 to k2 to convey the existence of a summary
data ﬂow. For example, in the summary of the average method, the nodes corresponding to the
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Figure 5.4: Partial program graph G(P) for P in Listing 5.3 with key nodes highlighted in cyan
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variables lSum, lLength, and the operator / are intermediate nodes in Figure 5.4 that are elided
in the summary in Figure 5.5. In their place are direct summary ﬂow edges from the callsites
of sum and List.size to the return value of the method.
Problem Statement. Given a program P, we formulate the problem of summary extraction
as the procedure of automatically generating the summary graph GS(P). In the next section,
we describe algorithms for each high-level step to automatically compute the summaries from
G(P).
5.5 Automatic Summary Extraction
Let P be a Java library for which we would like to extract summary data ﬂows. We perform
a one-time analysis of P using the Atlas, which constructs the Atlas program graph G(P)
for us. We explain our technique for summary computation in two parts. The ﬁrst subsection
describes in detail our algorithm for computing summaries of (local) data ﬂows within each
method, and the following subsection describes the corresponding algorithms for summarizing
interprocedural data ﬂows.
5.5.1 Mining Local Flows
Before we proceed to describe the algorithm to mine summary data ﬂows local to a method,
we introduce the notion of key nodes in G(P).
Key Nodes. We deﬁne key artifacts as precisely those nodes in the G(P) that must be
preserved in the summary graph GS(P). For the language of Java, the nodes we consider key
include:
 Method signature elements
 Formal parameters
 Formal implicit identity parameter
 Return node
 Call sites
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 Informal parameters
 Informal implicit identity parameter
 Return value
 Fields
 Literal values
 Deﬁnitions written to ﬁelds
 Deﬁnitions read from ﬁelds
 Array access operators and operands
 Array reference operand
 Array index operand
 For-each loop iterables and receivers
 Array Components
Remark 2. The key nodes inG(P) will diﬀer based on the language of the library, and hence the
notion of key nodes must be well deﬁned for the library's language prior to using our approach.
For example, G(P) for a library written in the C language will not contain the implicit identity
parameter, but may contain other key nodes such as pointers to ﬁelds and functions that have
to be preserved in the summary data ﬂow.
The algorithm for extracting a summary of local data ﬂows (i.e., within a method) is based
on the idea of eliding pre-processed def-use chains with respect to a set of key nodes in the
method. Given the program graph G(P), we begin by identifying the set K of key nodes
in the graph, and then reduce G(P) by preserving only the nodes in K and the reachability
information among them. As a result, all intermediate data ﬂow nodes and edges that occur
on paths between key nodes are elided for each method, resulting in a summary graph GS(P)
that is much smaller than G(P). Def-use paths occurring between key nodes in a method are
merged into simple edges, but key nodes are never elided.
70
Extracting Summary Flows. Given the set K and a pre-processed data ﬂow graph of def-use
chains provided by Atlas, the algorithm to compute elided summary data ﬂows with respect
to K is shown in Algorithm 1. The procedure MineFlow iterates over the key nodes in K. For
each key node k ∈ K, MineFlow ﬁnds all other key nodes K′ ⊂ K that are reachable along data
ﬂow paths that do not include other key nodes as intermediates, using the procedure ElidedFlow
(Line 3). For each such key node k′ ∈ K′, MineFlow introduces a summary ﬂow edge from k to
k′ (Lines 4-5).
Eliding Intermediate Nodes. The procedure
ElidedFlow computes the set of nearest-reachable key nodesK ′ for a given key node k by exploring
the data ﬂow graph breadth-ﬁrst starting from k. The procedure maintains a frontier containing
the set of nodes that have to be processed, initialized to {k}. In each iteration, it adds each
node f ′ in the frontier that has a key node successor to the return value (Lines 13-15); and
otherwise, it is added to the frontier so that further key nodes potentially reachable from k
via f ′ can be searched in a future iteration (Lines 13,16-17). ElidedFlow terminates when all
nodes in the frontier have been processed (Line 12). The set of nodes returned by ElidedFlow is
exactly the set of key nodes that are reachable from k via non-key intermediate nodes.
Remark 3. The attributes labeling each summary edge are determined based on the kind of
summary relationship being represented. For instance, if the origin or destination is a ﬁeld
deﬁnition, then the edge will be labeled with attributes indicating that it is a data ﬂow from or
to a ﬁeld. Labels are critical for distinguishing nodes and edges in a useful way; they allow us
to select and ﬁlter speciﬁc kinds of elements for traversal.
Our summary schema, described in Section 5.6.1, deﬁnes other kinds of relationships as
well, including array accesses, dynamic callsite information information, for-each iteration, and
resolved ﬂows to methods. Mining these relationships is straightforward, as they can be taken
directly from G(P) for inclusion in GS(P).
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Algorithm 1 Mining summary data ﬂows
1: procedure MineFlow(K, G(P))
2: for all k ∈ K do
3: reachable = ← ElidedFlow(k, K, G(P))
4: for all k′ ∈ reachable do
5: Add summary ﬂow edge from k to k′
6: end for
7: end for
8: end procedure
9: procedure ElidedFlow(k, K, G(P))
10: frontier ← {k}
11: result ← {∅}
12: for all f ∈ frontier do
13: frontier ← frontier - f
14: for all f ′ s.t. (f, f ′) is a data ﬂow edge in G(P) do
15: if f ′ ∈ K then
16: result ← result ∪f ′
17: else if f ′ /∈ frontier then
18: frontier ← frontier ∪f ′
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
return result
22: end procedure
5.5.2 Mining Interprocedural Flows
The task of mining interprocedural ﬂows involved in method calls, as well as dynamic call
site information, is somewhat more complex. First, we must decide which call sites to resolve at
present (during summary generation) and which cannot be resolved until summaries are applied
in the context of an analysis. If a potential target of a call site may lay outside of the library
after an application is introduced into the analysis context, then we must not resolve targets of
the call site at this time. Clearly static dispatches can be resolved during summary generation,
because the targets are unambiguous even with an open-world assumption about future analysis
contexts (see Remark 1).
Resolvable and Unresolvable Call Sites. It is important to distinguish between call sites
that can be statically-resolved and those which cannot at the time of summary generation. By
pre-resolving those which are statically-resolvable to their targets, we generate sound data ﬂow
relationships that a client can use, and prevent future rework by clients. Additionally, direct
interprocedural ﬂows are more compact to express than leaving a callsite description in the
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summaries. Thus, it is preferable to identify and resolve statically-dispatchable callsites at the
time of summary generation.
Although dynamic dispatches are not statically-resolvable in general, they become so under
certain circumstances. For instance, a call to a member method marked final or private cannot
possibly have polymorphic behavior, even under an open-world assumption. Similarly, a call to
a member method within a type that is marked final or anonymous is also unable to result in
polymorphism.
The algorithm to mine interprocedural summary ﬂows is shown in Algorithm 2. The proce-
dure MineCallsiteSummaries in Algorithm 2 calls the procedure ClassifyCallsites to partition the
set C of call sites as described above and returns (a) R+ containing call sites for which targets
may be unambiguously resolved even in the face of an open-world assumption at the time of
summary generation, and (b) R− containing call sites for which multiple targets (presently, or
in a future analysis context), may be resolved.
Next, the procedure MineMethodFlows is called for R+. For each call site, this procedure
resolves the target using a dispatch calculation6 (line 23) and adds summary ﬂow edges in
GS(P) connecting the informal call site parameters Pc to the corresponding formal parameters
Pj in the (resolved) target method mj 's deﬁnition (lines 24-27). MineMethodFlows concludes by
connecting the return ﬂows from the return value in the resolved method mj to the receiving
variable at the call site (line 29). Finally, the procedure MineDynamicDispatch is called for R−,
wherein the dynamic dispatch information for each call site in the G(P) is retained in the
summary GS(P) (lines 34-37) so that a client can resolve them in a future analysis context.
5.5.3 Summary Extraction Example
It may be easiest to understand the summary extraction process by way of an example.
Consider the
Integer class from the Java standard library, a subset of which we show in Listing 5.4. The
corresponding summaries are shown in Figure 5.6, where elements of GS(P) are diﬀerentiated
from G(P) using magenta highlighting.
6 Recall that each call site in R+ can be resolved to a single target.
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Algorithm 2 Mining method ﬂows and dynamic callsite information relationships
procedure MineCallsiteSummaries(C)
2: 〈R+,R−〉 = ClassifyCallsites(C)
MineMethodFlows(R+)
4: MineDynamicDispatch(R−)
end procedure
6: procedure ClassifyCallsites(C)
R+ ← ∅
8: R− ← ∅
for all c ∈ C do
10: if c is a static dispatch then
R+ ← R+ ∪ c
12: else if mi is final ∨ private ∨ constructor then
R+ ← R+ ∪ c
14: else if t is final ∨ private ∨ anonymous ∨ array then
R+ = R+ ∪ c
16: else
R− = R− ∪ c
18: end if
end for
return 〈R+,R−〉
20: end procedure
procedure MineMethodFlows(C)
22: for all c := 〈mi,Pc, rc, tc〉 ∈ C do
mj ← dispatch(c) . Unambiguous resolution of c to mj
24: Pc ← {pc1, pc2 . . . pc|Pc|} . Arguments passed at callsite c
Pj ← {pj1,pj2 . . . pj|Pj |} . Formal parameters to mj
26: for all pck ∈ Pc do
Add method ﬂow summary edge (pck, p
j
k) to G(P)
28: end for
Add return ﬂow summary edge (rj , r
c) to G(P)
30: end for
end procedure
32: procedure MineDynamicDispatch(C)
for all c := 〈mi,Pc, rc, tc〉 ∈ C do
34: Add dynamic callsite method edge (c, mi) to G(P)
Add dynamic callsite type edge (c, t) to G(P)
36: for all pck ∈ Pc do
Add dynamic callsite param edge (pck, c) to G(P)
38: end for
end for
40: end procedure
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1 public final class Integer extends Number implements Comparable <Integer > {
2 private final int value;
3
4 public Integer(int value) {
5 this.value = value;
6 }
7
8 public byte byteValue () {
9 return (byte) value;
10 }
11
12 public int compareTo(Integer object) {
13 return compare(value , object.value);
14 }
15
16 public static int compare(int lhs , int rhs) {
17 return lhs < rhs ? -1 : (lhs == rhs ? 0 : 1);
18 }
19 ...
20 }
Listing 5.4: Partial implementation of Integer from the Java standard library
We see the eﬀects of Algorithm 1 within each summarized method. For example, the condi-
tional operators and intermediate deﬁnitions in the compare method have been elided; the ﬂow
is simpliﬁed with respect to three possible literals that may ﬂow to the return. The eﬀects of
Algorithm 2 can be seen in the compareTo method, where there is a statically-resolvable call to
compare. FlowMiner has resolved the call automatically, showing the ﬂow of the two informal
parameters in compareTo to the formal parameter and identity parameters of compare, and the
corresponding ﬂow of the return value back to compareTo. Finally, this example also illustrates
ﬁeld reads and writes, which were imported directly to GS(P) from G(P) during mining. Using
this summary graph, we can succinctly and accurately track ﬂows through the Integer class.
5.6 Implementation
In this section we describe the implementation details of our approach for statically-extracting,
expressing, and subsequently employing data ﬂow summaries of Java libraries.
Architecture. FlowMiner is implemented as a plugin for the popular Eclipse IDE. This
choice was natural because Atlas, our underlying analysis platform, is also an Eclipse plugin.
As shown in the architectural diagram of Figure 5.7, FlowMiner takes Java library bytecode
as input, typically in the form of a JAR archive. Library bytecode is passed to Atlas for
indexing, a process which converts an AST into a rich, queryable graph database. After in-
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ﬂow (resolved call)
ﬂow (local) ﬂow (local) ﬂow (local)
ﬂow (local)
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Figure 5.6: Summary extraction results for the Integer class in Listing 5.4
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Figure 5.7: Architecture of FlowMiner
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dexing, FlowMiner runs the polynomial-time algorithms described in Section 5.5 to extract
a summarized version of the library's data ﬂow semantics. This summary data ﬂow graph is
packaged into a portable XML format for later use by existing static analyzers.
5.6.1 A Summary Graph Schema Extension
To express our summary data ﬂow semantics, we propose an extension to the XCSG schema
from Figure 5.3. We introduce several new kinds of local variables (nodes), as well as new
relationships (edges), shown in Figure 5.8. This schema extension allows us to express the
semantics of data ﬂows within methods, ﬂows to and from ﬁelds, as well as ﬂows involved in
static and virtual calls between methods. Like XCSG itself, our schema extension is organized
hierarchically and expressed via the use of tags for kinds and subkinds.
Important Features. There are several important features to note about our summary schema
extension. First, it is strictly an extension of the XCSG. The node types we introduce are
specialized subtypes of local variables. These specializations represent literal values, array
components and access operators, method call sites, and other important local deﬁnitions. The
edge types we introduce represent summary data ﬂows, array accesses, for-each iteration, and
call site information.
Second, our summaries pertain only to data ﬂow. While a ﬂow edge (A, B) implies the
existence of a control ﬂow path along which this ﬂow happens, we do not retain control ﬂow
nodes and edges from G(P). This allows GS(P) to be much more compact than the library
itself, which was one of our design goals.
Third, our summaries retain suﬃcient information to be used with context, type, ﬁeld,
object, and ﬂow sensitivity. The client using the summaries for subsequent analysis is able to
decide which categories of sensitivity to employ in order to achieve the desired level of accuracy
and speed. One consequence of this philosophy is that we only resolve ﬂows for method call
sites when the target can be unambiguously resolved to a single possibility with an open-world
assumption. That is, no matter what other types and methods are introduced into an analysis
context by an application, the resolution decision for the call site cannot be changed. We leave
dynamic dispatch call sites to be resolved when summaries are applied to an analysis context,
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Summary Nodes
 Array Component : Array components (on heap) of a referenced array
 Array Index Op: Array access operator, takes array reference and idx as operands and
selects a component
 Call Site: Represents a method call, as well as the value returned.
 Call Site Resolved : Statically-resolved call site
 Call Site Unresolved : Dynamic call site
 Literal : Literal primitive or String value
Summary Edges
 Array Access: Connects array index operator to an array component node
 Dynamic Callsite: Describes an aspect of a dynamic dispatch call site
 Dynamic Callsite Param: Origin stack param is informal parameter for destination
call site
 Dynamic Callsite This: Origin object reference is implicit identity parameter for
destination call site
 Dynamic Callsite Signature: Call site points to its invoked method signature
 Dynamic Callsite Type: Call site points to its stated identity param type
 Flow : Data ﬂow relationship
 Array Flow : Flow to or from array component
 Field Flow : Flow to or from a ﬁeld
 Local Flow : Flow between local variables
 Resolved Method Flow : Flow to method parameters or from a method return
 For Each: Iteration over Iterable or array type to local receiver variable
Figure 5.8: Summary nodes and edges in FlowMiner's XCSG schema extension
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since we cannot know ahead of time if that context may introduce new possibilities for the
target of the call site. However, we do provide the signature of the call site, as well as the
informal stack parameters involved in the call, so that clients may resolve it later.
Our summary schema extension borrows philosophically from the rich XCSG schema of At-
las [50]. Our research group uses Atlas for summary extraction, application, and subsequent
program analysis. Background about Atlas is provided in Section 5.3. It should be noted that
the concepts discussed in this paper are general; other static analysis tools besides Atlas may
be used to mine, apply, and subsequently use our summaries.
5.6.2 A Portable XML Schema
In order to serialize GS(P) for subsequent use in a partial program analysis, we require a
portable document format. XML is a well-known, widely-used format for creating structured
documents. There are many mature libraries available for verifying, parsing, and writing XML
documents. Therefore, encoding XCSG with our schema extension described in Subsection 5.6.1
in terms of an XML document format seemed an obvious choice for portability and convenience.
An XML schema document (XSD) deﬁning the grammar for expressing software graphs is
provided with the open source reference implementation of FlowMiner [49].
5.7 Discussion
Using Summaries. Having used Atlas and FlowMiner to perform a one-time analysis of a
library to extract its data ﬂow semantics, an existing static analyzer can apply these summaries
to achieve a complete and accurate program analysis. What it means to "apply" summaries
will diﬀer based on the tooling used by the client. For analyzers implemented on top of the
Atlas platform, applying summaries means translating the portable XML summary document
into additional nodes and edges from GS(P) for insertion into the program graph G(P) of an
application. Once inserted, these supplementary data ﬂow semantics can be used for subsequent
analysis.
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Recall the example malicious Android app from Section 5.2, for which a static analyzer was
unable to detect the malicious behavior. The application asynchronously leaks the user's device
ID and SIM card number to an attacker. We deﬁned the values returned by
TelephyManager.getSimSerialNumber and TelephonyManager.getDeviceId to be sensitive information,
and asked our analyzer to track forward data ﬂows from these artifacts. The result, shown in
Figure 5.2, ran into a dead end as soon as the ﬂow disappeared into the private implementation
of Android's AsyncTask.execute API.
After applying GS(P) extracted from a one-time analysis of Android 4.4.4, we are able to
obtain the result in Figure 5.9. Summary nodes and edges (GS(P)) are highlighted in magenta
to distinguish them from elements of the original Atlas program graph (G(P)). By employing
GS(P), our static analyzer is able to detect the entirety of the malicious ﬂow! After the sensitive
information enters AsyncTask.execute, our summaries of Android track the asynchronous data
ﬂow involving local ﬂows, a method call, a write and read of a ﬁeld, and ﬁnally a callback into
the application (MainActivity$1.doInBackground) on a new thread. From there, our analyzer uses
G(P) to follow the ﬂow through an enhanced for loop, string concatenation, and ultimately to
the URL constructor, completing the leak.
Thanks to our extracted summaries of Android data ﬂow semantics, we are now able to
accomplish complete and accurate partial program data ﬂow analyses of Android applications.
As mentioned previously, the techniques involved are not speciﬁc to Android; FlowMiner
can summarize data ﬂows within any Java library. The Android example is motivated by our
original use case for DARPA's APAC program.
5.8 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the expressiveness, soundness, completeness, and scalability
properties of FlowMiner and its summaries.
5.8.1 Expressiveness.
The data ﬂow summaries extracted by FlowMiner are extremely rich and expressive.
For example, the coarse information ﬂow speciﬁcations at the granularity of object tainting
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Example
com.example
MainActivity
onCreate
simSerial = tm.getSimSerialNumber();
simSerial=
getSimSerialNumber(...)
deviceID = tm.getDeviceId();
deviceID=
getDeviceId(...)
MainActivity$1
new AsyncTask() {...}
doInBackground
try
new URL(url).openConnection();
spec
url += "&" + s;
+
url=
+
enhanced for (params)
s
iterable
params[]
onPause
→ at.execute(deviceID, simSerial);
arrayInit
[][] params
[@]
deviceIDsimSerial
android.jar
java.net
URL
URL
spec
android.os
AsyncTask
AsyncTask
AsyncTask$2
call
local
WorkerRunnable
mParams[]
executeOnExecutor
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local
execute
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Figure 5.9: Partial program analysis of malicious app from Listing 5.1 with FlowMiner sum-
maries of Android
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False Positive
True Positive
Field Taint
Object Taint
Figure 5.10: Coarse ﬂow speciﬁcations that taint entire objects rather than ﬁelds lead to false
positive ﬂows.
generated by Clapp et al. [40] can be directly inferred from our summaries. When information
in a FlowMiner summary reaches a member ﬁeld deﬁnition, the corresponding "taint" on
the object is implied. When information ﬂows from a member ﬁeld to a method return, it is
implied that the object "taints" the method return. Therefore, FlowMiner summaries are
strictly more expressive than the most closely-related prior work.
More importantly, our summaries can be used more accurately. Figure 5.10 shows how
coarse speciﬁcations that taint entire objects can lead to an exponential number of implied false
positive ﬂows. The ﬁgure shows three types with two ﬁelds each. Dashed arrows represent
transfer of taint at the granularity of objects, while solid arrows represent transfer of taint with
ﬁeld granularity. While a subset of the ﬂows implied by object granularity are true positives
(black), the majority of ﬂows will be false positives (red). In general, a ﬂow involving object-
granularity summaries that traverses through N classes (with K unrelated ﬁelds each) will
produce on the order of KN false positive ﬂows!
Similarly, the presence of registration/callback pairs identiﬁed by EdgeMiner [34] can also
be inferred from FlowMiner summaries. Because FlowMiner encodes details of virtual
callsites for which multiple runtime targets may exist, the set of callback sites will be a subset
of the callsites in GS(P). A polynomial-time structural analysis of application subtypes and
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method override relationships can be used to identify this subset. Then, for each potential
callback site, a reverse data ﬂow analysis on our summary semantics can be used to ﬁnd APIs
that "register" callbacks. Hence, the summaries extracted by FlowMiner could directly be
used by EdgeMiner to identify callback and registration pairs.
5.8.2 Soundness.
We observe that the data ﬂow summaries produced by FlowMiner are sound, i.e., there is
never a false positive; if a ﬂow is indicated, it can actually occur at runtime. This follows from
the way in which our summaries are generated (see Section 5.4 for details).
First, local ﬂows within a method follow directly from deﬁnition-use chains that are prepro-
cessed by Atlas in a ﬂow-sensitive manner along valid control ﬂow paths. By deﬁnition, these
ﬂows can and do occur at runtime within a method. Our algorithm to elide (simplify) these
ﬂows with respect to key nodes preserves soundness; if a ﬂow path from A to B was present in
the original sequence of def-use relationships, it is preserved after we have elided the ﬂow. This
process never introduces spurious new ﬂows, but rather simpliﬁes existing ﬂows, thus preserving
soundness.
Second, ﬂows to and from ﬁeld deﬁnitions are sound. Unlike the information ﬂow speciﬁ-
cations produced by Clapp et al. [40], FlowMiner retains the granularity of individual ﬁeld
deﬁnitions and variables. Thus, we avoid conﬂating ﬂows through unrelated ﬁelds. Additionally,
FlowMiner preserves object alias attributes on ﬁeld ﬂow edges; this allows our summaries to
be leveraged in an object-sensitive way to avoid false positives.
Third, the manner in which FlowMiner resolves interprocedural ﬂows involved in method
calls is sound. A method call site is pre-resolved to a target by FlowMiner if and only if the
target can be statically resolved in the presence of an open-world assumption. That is, when the
library is used by an application (which may create arbitrary subtypes and overriding method
deﬁnitions), the call sites pre-resolved by FlowMiner remain statically-resolvable. For all
other call sites, our summaries capture the structural details of the call site (method signature,
stated type, informal parameters) that will be needed to resolve the call in the future. But we
cannot and do not attempt to pre-suppose one or more runtime targets. In fact, some runtime
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targets may exist only in external application contexts, so resolution is only possible given a
speciﬁc client application context. Therefore, we avoid false positive ﬂows for virtual method
calls which are not statically-resolvable.
As a consequence of the above observations, the data ﬂow summaries generated by FlowMiner
are sound. Put diﬀerently, the removal of any summary ﬂow edge would remove critical infor-
mation needed later to compute a data ﬂow in some partial program analysis context.
5.8.3 Completeness.
In the sense that it does not miss any true ﬂows, FlowMiner provides complete summaries
of data ﬂow semantics with a few exceptions. The completeness properties of FlowMiner
follow directly from the completeness properties of the Atlas analysis platform on which it is
built. At this time, Atlas fully supports the features of the Java 7 programming language. In
this sense, all local, ﬁeld, and method ﬂows between Java program elements will be captured.
However, there are a few minor challenges to completeness.
Java, like many other languages, contains an introspection mechanism known as reﬂection.
Java's reﬂection APIs allow a program to dynamically locate and access arbitrary program
elements, even allowing the violation of language-imposed information hiding. The Atlas
program graph captures calls to Java's reﬂection APIs but does not attempt to statically-resolve
their eﬀects. For example, a class can write to a private member ﬁeld of an unrelated class with
a series of calls to reﬂection APIs. In this case, Atlas will show these calls, but will not directly
index a ﬁeld write. Introspection mechanisms such as reﬂection present a well-known challenge
for static analysis techniques in general.
Another challenge to completeness involves interactions between programming languages.
For example, a Java program may call into a native C binary, which may itself call back into
the Java program. While cross-language interaction is not an issue for pure Java libraries, it
presents a challenge for mixed-language libraries. Our research group is currently working on
an analysis solution for mixed Java and C/C++ libraries, though this paper does not describe
that work.
85
T
ab
le
5.
1:
E
xp
er
im
en
ta
lr
es
ul
ts
sh
ow
in
g
th
e
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
of
F
l
o
w
M
in
e
r
on
p
op
ul
ar
Ja
va
lib
ra
ri
es
in
te
rm
s
of
co
m
pa
ct
ne
ss
an
d
ac
cu
ra
cy
.
(∗
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
ob
je
ct
-g
ra
nu
la
ri
ty
ﬂo
w
s
th
at
ar
e
fa
ls
e
p
os
it
iv
es
co
m
pa
re
d
to
th
os
e
pr
od
uc
ed
by
F
l
o
w
M
in
e
r
)
L
ib
ra
ry
|V
|
|E
|
|V
S
|
|E
S
|
|V
S
|/|
V
|
(%
)
|E
S
|/|
E
|
(%
)
F
ie
ld
F
lo
w
s
O
b
je
ct
F
lo
w
s
%
F
al
se
P
os
it
iv
es
∗
el
im
in
at
ed
ju
ni
t-
4.
12
74
16
9
30
86
96
22
13
5
66
61
2
29
.8
4%
21
.5
7%
89
0
30
19
70
.5
2%
te
st
ng
-6
.8
.2
1
24
10
21
11
61
42
1
84
00
1
26
03
51
34
.8
5%
22
.4
1%
36
6
40
50
90
.9
6%
w
ic
ke
t-
co
re
-6
.1
9.
0
39
00
99
19
40
64
7
14
07
86
43
16
77
36
.0
8%
22
.2
4%
11
17
2
80
17
3
86
.0
7%
sp
ri
ng
-w
eb
ﬂo
w
-2
.4
.0
13
89
72
58
72
70
44
39
9
13
40
74
31
.9
4%
22
.8
3%
60
8
36
20
83
.2
0%
st
ru
ts
2-
co
re
-2
.3
.2
0
17
11
71
76
35
87
56
20
8
16
83
07
32
.8
3%
22
.0
4%
47
31
61
38
2
92
.2
9%
co
m
m
on
s-
co
lle
ct
io
ns
4-
4.
0
15
27
45
98
82
75
51
73
5
15
91
47
33
.8
7%
16
.1
0%
13
24
8
69
67
9
80
.9
9%
co
m
m
on
s-
io
-2
.4
72
75
4
28
57
13
20
98
4
63
45
0
28
.8
4%
22
.2
0%
17
11
83
54
79
.5
2%
co
m
m
on
s-
la
ng
3-
3.
3.
2
17
83
19
75
21
37
57
00
6
17
49
55
31
.9
6%
23
.2
6%
10
28
0
34
74
3
70
.4
1%
A
nd
ro
id
4.
2.
2
66
51
27
7
33
96
40
70
24
67
99
1
76
64
28
0
37
.1
1%
22
.5
7%
11
29
52
3
16
05
30
60
92
.9
6%
A
nd
ro
id
4.
3.
1
68
67
24
5
35
16
56
16
25
47
55
8
79
15
45
0
37
.1
0%
22
.5
1%
12
06
54
2
16
81
64
90
92
.8
3%
A
nd
ro
id
4.
4.
4
77
07
68
8
44
15
02
41
28
50
10
4
88
55
58
5
36
.9
8%
20
.0
6%
12
16
17
8
17
06
94
68
92
.8
8%
A
nd
ro
id
5.
0.
2
86
84
20
8
45
64
90
66
32
17
47
6
10
01
06
47
37
.0
5%
21
.9
3%
15
56
02
7
21
87
46
91
92
.8
9%
86
5.8.4 Experiments.
With the goal of evaluating FlowMiner's accuracy and compactness when summarizing
real world Java software libraries, we summarized a selection of popular Java libraries, including
utilities, test frameworks, and web client frameworks, including the recent versions of the An-
droid operating system7. We ran our experiments on a multi-core computer with 64 GB RAM,
with Eclipse Luna installed with Atlas 2.1.5 and FlowMiner. In Table 5.1 we present the
libraries we used (P) and results of our experiments. We downloaded the Java libraries listed
in column 1 of Table 5.1 along with their dependencies listed by the Maven central repository.
We created a simple Atlas analyzer to gather the summary statistics listed in Table 5.1.
Comparing the size of the original program graph provided by Atlas (G(P)) to the size of
the summary graph (GS(P)), we see that the sizes of the summary graphs are around 30% as
large as the original program graphs, indicating that summaries produced by FlowMiner are
signiﬁcantly compacted.
The table also shows the number of data ﬂow edges induced in the summary by FlowMiner
(ﬁne-grained approach that tracks data ﬂows at ﬁeld level granularity) ranges from about 7%
to 30% of that induced by the coarse-grained approach (that tracks data ﬂows at object level
granularity). This means that over 70% of the ﬂows induced by coarse-grained approach are
false positives as explained earlier. In particular, for Android 4.4.4, this metric (92.88% false
positives) indicates the signiﬁcance of our approach to malware detection, as the Android oper-
ating system is critical for the analysis of Android apps. A similar trend is seen for three other
recent versions of the Android operating system.
Correctness We also empirically veriﬁed the soundness and completeness of our FlowMiner
implementation for each of the Java libraries (column 1 of Table 5.1) chosen for our experiments
as follows. We ﬁrst computed both the Atlas program graph G(P) and the summary graph
GS(P), and then successfully veriﬁed the property that there is a data ﬂow path from one key
node k to another key node k′ in GS(P) if and only if there is a corresponding data ﬂow path
from k to k′ in G(P).
7 We generated the JVM bytecode for the Android operating system from the Android build for the
aosp_arm-user device conﬁguration.
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5.8.5 Scalability.
We have tested FlowMiner on very large libraries. For example, Android 4.4.4 (KitKat)
contains roughly 2 million lines of Java code, even after comments and white space have been
omitted. At this scale, Atlas requires around 30 minutes and 20GB of memory to index the
library with commodity PC hardware. FlowMiner completes its one-time analysis and export
of data ﬂow summary semantics within an additional 45 minutes. For the smaller libraries that
we tested, FlowMiner needed 1 minute or less (including the time Atlas takes to construct
the original program graph). Hence, FlowMiner scales well even for summarizing extremely
large libraries.
In addition to the scalability of summary mining, the compactness of extracted summary
artifacts is important for practical use. For example, GS(P) for Android 4.4.4 contains only
36.98% of the nodes and 20.06% of the edges of G(P). Hence, our summaries provide an order-
of-magnitude savings versus a fully-detailed program graph of a library, yet retain the critical
details for use in a partial-program data ﬂow analysis. This is a key justiﬁcation for the use of
summaries versus full library implementation.
5.9 Related Work
Summarizing Call Graphs. There has been a lot of recent interest in the extraction of API
summaries of software libraries. Much of the work in this area focuses on extracting summaries
that describe control ﬂow transitions within the library. Such control-ﬂow summaries are useful
for routine static analysis tasks such as call graph generation [74, 150, 147, 7], tracking of non-
trivial calling relationships between application and the library (e.g., asynchronous callbacks in
Android) [34] and visualization of control ﬂows from the application to the library and vice-versa
[99].
Summarizing Data Flow Graphs. Despite the interest in library summaries, there is not
much closely-related work in the area of mining data ﬂows from software libraries, a task that
is particularly crucial for security-critical analyses. Malware detection in Android apps [68], for
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example, requires tracking the ﬂow of sensitive information (source, e.g, IMEI number) from
the mobile device to potentially harmful destinations (sinks, e.g., a location on the internet).
Callahan ﬁrst proposed the program summary graph as implemented in PTOOL [33] as
a way to compactly represent the inter-procedural call and data ﬂow semantics of the whole
program. Rountev et al. [122] pointed out the need to use summaries of data ﬂow semantics
when analyzing applications that are dependent on large libraries. They proposed a general
theoretical framework for summarizing data ﬂow semantics of large libraries, using pre-computed
summary functions per library component and building on the work of Pnueli [115].
Similarly to Rountev et al., Chatterjee et al.[37] compute a summary function for each
procedure in the bottom up traversal order of the call graph such that the summary of a caller
is expressed in terms of the summary of the callee component(s). More recently, Rountev et
al. [123] described an approach for summarizing libraries by using a graph representation of
dataﬂow summary functions, and by abstracting away redundant dataﬂow facts that are internal
to the library, in a similar vein to our concept of eliding ﬂows.
Some approaches compute summary information for a software component independently
of the callers and callees of that component. For example, Ali et al. developed a tool,
AVERROES[8], to generate a placeholder that overapproximates the behaviour of a given li-
brary. Their overapproximation may be too coarse to be useful in some scenarios such as
malware detection, where we need summaries to retain enough information for various kinds of
sensitive analyses.
Summarizing Android Flows. To the best of our knowledge, the most closely related work
in summarizing libraries in the context of Android is by Clapp et al. [40], who employ a dy-
namic analysis approach to mine information ﬂows from Android. In their two-part system,
Droidrecord provides an instrumented Android emulation environment in which concrete execu-
tion traces can be recorded. Modelgen post-processes these trace logs to infer information ﬂow
speciﬁcations. Their approach successfully recovers 96% of a set of hand-written information
ﬂow speciﬁcations. The strengths of this work are its automation, the small size of its infor-
mation ﬂow speciﬁcations, and the fact that statically-diﬃcult ﬂows (reﬂection, cross-language
ﬂows) are captured by dynamic analysis. While this work lays a strong foundation for the
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kind of library data ﬂow summaries we desire, the following aspects limit the usefulness of the
approach and suggest an alternative.
First, the authors' use of dynamic analysis to identify information ﬂow relationships between
the input and output variables of a method inherently makes it infeasible to cover all possible
paths in the library, unavoidably introducing false negatives. Second, the information ﬂow
speciﬁcations produced are too coarse to be used accurately; information ﬂow is summarized at
the level of granularity of objects rather than the granularity of ﬁelds and other variables. This
causes unrelated ﬂows to become conﬂated, as in Figure 5.10. For example, a method parameter
that is written to a ﬁeld of an object is considered to "taint" the entire object. Therefore, ﬂows
through unrelated ﬁelds are join the same taint, producing false positives.
Third, their information ﬂow speciﬁcations express ﬂows only between elements of the li-
brary's public surface (API), throwing away all other ﬂows through intermediate variables and
functions. This limits the ability of a subsequent static analysis to use the mined speciﬁcations
in an accurate way. For example, a static analyzer might have used the details of calling con-
texts and object types to restrict a summary ﬂow to valid constraints, but these details are not
present in the ﬂow speciﬁcations. Finally, their ﬂow speciﬁcations fail to capture potential ﬂows
from a library back into an application introduced by polymorphic call sites. For example, an
application can deﬁne a subtype of a library type, providing overriding method deﬁnitions. At
runtime, virtual call sites in the library may result in calls and ﬂows back into the application.
Our work addresses all these issues. We use static analysis (built on top of the Atlas
platform) instead of dynamic analysis to identify possible ﬂows within the library. Hence, we
avoid the possibility that some execution paths are not covered. Next, the ﬂow speciﬁcations
extracted by FlowMiner track and preserve data ﬂows at the granularity of individual vari-
ables and deﬁnitions within methods and objects, so we avoid falsely merging unrelated ﬂows.
Furthermore, our ﬂow speciﬁcations express ﬂows among program elements that are not neces-
sarily on the library API. This allows subsequent analyses to be context, ﬁeld, type, object, and
ﬂow-sensitive. Finally, we retain the details of virtual call sites so that ﬂows involving potential
callbacks into an application are captured.
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5.10 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented FlowMiner, a novel solution to the common problem of
incomplete results for partial program data ﬂow analyses. We propose a one-time analysis of a
library to extract a summary of its data ﬂow semantics. Once extracted, the summary can be
leveraged to achieve complete and accurate partial program analysis. We have shown that our
summaries are compact, containing on average 26.89% of the nodes and 16.32% of the edges of
the original library program graphs. Yet they are also ﬁne-grained retaining individual ﬁeld
deﬁnitions, for example, avoids 93.07% of the false positive ﬂows indicated by tainting entire
objects. We have illustrated the usefulness of summary data ﬂow semantics with a motivating
malicious Android application whose malice cannot be detected without summary semantics
for Android, shown that FlowMiner's summaries solve this scenario, and compared our work
against existing state-of-the-art tools. Our contributions include:
 We develop a static analysis technique to automatically generate ﬁne-grained, expressive
summary speciﬁcations given the source or bytecode of any Java library.
 Our algorithms identify and retain key artifacts of the program semantics necessary
to allow context, object, ﬂow, ﬁeld, and type-sensitive data ﬂow analyses in the future
when using our summaries.
 Our summaries use a rich, multi-attributed graph as the mathematical abstraction
to encode ﬁne-grained summaries, rather than coarse binary relations between the
inputs and outputs of library API.
 The generated summaries are compact and signiﬁcantly smaller than the original
library, as non-key features in the ﬂows of the original library are elided into key
paths.
 We provide FlowMiner, an open-source reference implementation [49] of our algorithms
that extracts summaries given the source or bytecode of a library and exports them to a
portable, tool-agnostic format.
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 We validate FlowMiner by demonstrating that our summaries of popular libraries are
much smaller than the original programs, yet more expressive and accurate than other
state-of-the-art summary techniques.
There are a number of future research directions that should be investigated. Data ﬂow
semantics are only one aspect of software; other aspects include control ﬂow, domain-speciﬁc
resource use (ﬁle system, network, etc.), potential error codes or exceptions thrown, permissions
required, and many more. Ultimately, the desired summary of a library will depend upon
the intended program analysis use cases. For example, an analysis to determine whether an
application has properly-implemented error-handling would require a summary of error codes
and exceptions for any libraries used. Finally, we note that the implementation described in
this paper focuses on summaries of data ﬂow semantics for Java libraries. Future work might
generalize our proposed XCSG schema extension to apply to other languages and multi-language
software stacks.
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5.11.2 Tools and Documentation
FlowMiner has been open-sourced under the MIT License. Its source code can be obtained
on GitHub:
https://github.com/powerofpi/FlowMiner
Instructions, support, and an update site are available for download at:
http://powerofpi.github.io/FlowMiner/
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This thesis describes the identiﬁcation of, solutions for, and evaluation of three important
important research questions motivated by our group's participation in DARPA's APAC pro-
gram. This chapter provides a summary of my contributions, results, and suggestions for future
research on each research topic.
6.1 Atlas
How should a software analysis platform be built to facilitate both au-
tomation and human comprehension?
Chapter 3 presents Atlas, a novel program analysis platform employing an attributed graph-
based software abstraction. While prior work provides either automated analyses or static
program visualizations, Atlas simultaneously supports automation, interaction, and program
comprehension. For automation, Atlas provides a powerful embedded Java DSL for writing
analyzers to query an optimized in-memory graph database. For comprehension, it provides
interactive software graph visualizations with one-to-one source code correspondence, a Smart
View for invoking conﬁgured scripts in response to user clicks on source tokens and graph
elements, and an Interpreter View for making on-demand queries. As a sophisticated user of
Atlas at ISU on the APAC program, and as a former intern at EnSoft, my contributions
include:
 An API for modifying and extending the software graph using client-side indexers
 Reﬁnements and improvements to the Smart View for dynamically invoking analysis
scripts in response to clicks
94
 Suggestions, feedback, and improvement requests for analysis APIs and software graph
schema features
 Experimental evaluation and feedback for Atlas as a platform for writing analyzers,
including the Security Toolbox and FlowMiner.
 Experimental evaluation and feedback for Atlas as a program comprehension tool, as an
analyst during malware detection experiments
Atlas has been experimentally-validated in several ways. Our group at ISU tested its po-
tential as a framework for writing analyzers by successfully constructing and demonstrating
the eﬀectiveness of both the Security Toolbox and FlowMiner. The analysis APIs that
Atlas provides allowed us to create powerful, fast, and accurate analyzers with minimal eﬀort
and very few lines of code. As a platform to facilitate program comprehension, Atlas was
extensively tested during the APAC malware detection experiments. In conjunction with the
Security Toolbox, our analysts employed the Interpreter and Smart Views to understand
unfamiliar code and interactively discover malware, achieving best-in-class detection perfor-
mance (see Section 6.2). Finally, other students in our research group have used Atlas to
verify safe synchronization and memory safety properties of the Linux kernel with much less
time and eﬀort than other state-of-the-art defect detection tools.
As mature as Atlas is already, there are several directions for future research. First, its
software graph schema needs to be semantically-formalized and abstracted to apply to many
programming languages. EnSoft is already pursuing this goal with its new graph schema,
eXtensible Common Software Graph (XCSG)[105]. Second, there is an opportunity for the
memory footprint and performance of Atlas APIs to be further optimized. Query optimization
is a well-studied topic; however, there is the potential to exploit the speciﬁc structure of software
graphs for speed. Finally, Atlas would be an even more potent program comprehension tool
if support were added for on-the-ﬂy graph simpliﬁcations. Program subgraphs are often too
large for users to quickly comprehend; there is an opportunity to provide simpliﬁed views with
a click to drill down into details paradigm.
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6.2 Security Toolbox
How can a man-machine analysis system detect novel, sophisticated, and
domain-speciﬁc malware?
Chapter 4 presents the Security Toolbox, a human-in-the-loop system for detecting novel,
sophisticated, domain-speciﬁc Android malware. Prior work lacks the ﬂexibility to detect novel
malware, or else employs a traditional two-pass approach in which a user must manually review
and reject a large number of false alarms produced by the automation phase. The Security
Toolbox solves this problem with a human-in-the-loop approach. Our automated smell and
property analyzers uncover an initial set of interesting program behaviors, presenting them to
the user in a convenient Dashboard view so that they can be systematically-reviewed and an-
notated. The analyst is able to use these artifacts to formulate domain-speciﬁc ﬂaw hypotheses
and issue follow-up questions using a set of provided analysis primitives. As a security analyst
and primary developer of the Security Toolbox, my contributions include:
 Creation of smell and property analyzers for interesting program behaviors
 Sophisticated analysis utilities for:
 Indexing Android XML resources
 Symbolic value analysis
 Software graph alignment
 State-of-the-art type inference
 Experimental validation as a security analyst for APAC experiments
During Phase I of APAC, we employed the Security Toolbox and the program comprehen-
sion features of Atlas to audit 77 Android applications, 62 of which contained novel, state-of-
the-art malware. We successfully identiﬁed the malicious functionality in 57 of the 62 apps, with
an average analysis time of only 1.13 hours per app. These results dramatically outperformed
a control team using only state-of-the-art commercial tooling, and were best-in-class among
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APAC performers. Additionally, we discovered many unintended bugs and vulnerabilities that
were not counted in the oﬃcial data. As tempting as it may be to attribute our success to
the intellect of our analysts, we credit our outperformance to our human-in-the-loop malware
detection philosophy and symbiotic relationship with the Atlas platform.
There are a number of possible follow-up research directions for the Security Toolbox.
First, it is widely-known that most Android malware in the wild is unsophisticated and makes
little attempt to hide itself from detection. There is an opportunity to create a fully-automated
version of the Security Toolbox for detecting everyday, simplistic, proﬁt-driven malware.
Second, improvements can and should be made to further integrate the human analyst into
the analysis loop, by prioritizing detected program behaviors and automatically suggesting
domain-speciﬁc ﬂaw hypotheses. The Security Toolbox could be enhanced with a taxon-
omy or cookbook of related ﬂaw hypotheses in order to assist the user with the process of
brainstorming. Finally, the Security Toolbox should fully utilize the summaries of An-
droid produced by FlowMiner to increase its automation potential. Analysis sub-steps whose
automation was not previously possible due to partial program analysis should be revisited.
6.3 FlowMiner
How can expressive, compact information ﬂow summaries be mined from a li-
brary for accurate and scalable partial program analysis?
Chapter 5 presents FlowMiner, a tool for mining expressive yet compact data ﬂow sum-
maries of Java libraries for partial program analysis. Prior work in this area creates summaries
that are too coarse to be used accurately and do not capture the semantics of callbacks. Sum-
maries produced by FlowMiner do capture callbacks, and also retain suﬃcient detail to be
used with context, ﬁeld, ﬂow, type, and object-sensitivity. Yet, they are compacted to be an
order of magnitude smaller than the original program graph of a library. My contributions
include:
 Expressive, ﬁne-grained summary ﬂow speciﬁcations with suﬃcient detail for context,
ﬁeld, ﬂow, type, and object-sensitive use
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 Summary compaction, allowing ﬂow speciﬁcations to be losslessly-compacted with respect
to key features
 A novel graph-based summary extraction algorithm to mine elided data ﬂows
 An open-source reference implementation (FlowMiner) of our summary extraction al-
gorithm
 Empirical evaluation of FlowMiner data ﬂow summaries on a handful of the most
popular third-party Java libraries.
In our evaluation of FlowMiner for some of the most popular third-party Java libraries, we
found that our summary graphs had an average of 26.89% as many vertices and 16.32% as many
edges as the original library program graphs. We also empirically demonstrated the importance
of ﬁne-granularity The most closely related work tracks ﬂows at the level of object granularity
rather than ﬁeld granularity, which produces an average of 93.07% false positive ﬁeld read/write
ﬂows.
While data ﬂow summaries of library components are very useful for security-critical anal-
yses, future work should investigate the potential for use of other diverse kinds of library sum-
maries. Examples might include summaries of control ﬂows, error codes or exceptions, permis-
sions used, and domain-speciﬁc resource usage. The nature of the summary desired will depend
upon the intended subsequent analysis use cases. Finally, FlowMiner should be extended to
analyze libraries written in languages other than Java.
98
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Y. Aafer, W. Du, and H. Yin. Droidapiminer: Mining api-level features for robust malware
detection in android. In Proc. of International Conference on Security and Privacy in
Communication Networks (SecureComm), 2013. 17, 45
[2] S. K. Ahmed Tamrawi, Gui Kang. Event ﬂow graphs to verify absence of vulnerabilities
and malicious behaviors. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering (submitted), 2013.
26, 32
[3] A. Aiken, S. Bugrara, I. Dillig, T. Dillig, B. Hackett, and P. Hawkins. An overview of the
saturn project. Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGSOFT workshop on Program
analysis for software tools and engineering - PASTE '07, pages 4348, 2007. 26
[4] S. B. Akers. Binary decision diagrams. Computers, IEEE Transactions on, 100(6):509
516, 1978. 26
[5] M. Alazab, V. Moonsamy, L. Batten, P. Lantz, and R. Tian. Analysis of malicious and
benign android applications. In Distributed Computing Systems Workshops (ICDCSW),
2012 32nd International Conference on, pages 608616. IEEE, 2012. 17
[6] K. Ali. The Separate Compilation Assumption. PhD thesis, University of Waterloo, 2014.
22
[7] K. Ali and O. Lhoták. Application-only call graph construction. In ECOOP 2012Object-
Oriented Programming, pages 688712. Springer, 2012. 22, 87
[8] K. Ali and O. Lhoták. Averroes: Whole-program analysis without the whole program. In
ECOOP 2013Object-Oriented Programming, pages 378400. Springer, 2013. 22, 88
99
[9] P. Amey, R. Chapman, and N. White. Smart certiﬁcation of mixed criticality systems. In
Reliable Software TechnologyAda-Europe 2005, pages 144155. Springer, 2005. 23
[10] P. Anderson, T. Reps, T. Teitelbaum, and M. Zarins. Tool support for ﬁne-grained
software inspection. Software, IEEE, 20(4):4250, 2003. 11
[11] N. Antunes and M. Vieira. Comparing the eﬀectiveness of penetration testing and static
code analysis on the detection of sql injection vulnerabilities in web services. In Dependable
Computing, 2009. PRDC'09. 15th IEEE Paciﬁc Rim International Symposium on, pages
301306. IEEE, 2009. 12
[12] A. Apvrille and T. Strazzere. Reducing the window of opportunity for android malware
gotta catch'em all. Journal in Computer Virology, 8(1-2):6171, 2012. 16
[13] D. Arp, M. Spreitzenbarth, M. Hübner, H. Gascon, K. Rieck, and C. Siemens. Drebin:
Eﬀective and explainable detection of android malware in your pocket. In Proc. of NDSS,
2014. 17
[14] S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer, C. Fritz, E. Bodden, A. Bartel, J. Klein, Y. Le Traon, D. Octeau, and
P. McDaniel. Flowdroid: Precise context, ﬂow, ﬁeld, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware
taint analysis for android apps. In Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGPLAN Conference
on Programming Language Design and Implementation, page 29. ACM, 2014. 20
[15] K. Au, Y. Zhou, Z. Huang, and D. Lie. Pscout: Analyzing the android permission
speciﬁcation. Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, 2012. 19, 41, 46
[16] Z. Aung and W. Zaw. Permission-based android malware detection. International Journal
of Scientiﬁc and Technology Research, 2(3):228234, 2013. 17
[17] A. Aurum, H. Petersson, and C. Wohlin. State-of-the-art: software inspections after 25
years. Software Testing, Veriﬁcation and Reliability, 12(3):133154, 2002. 11
100
[18] A. Austin, C. Holmgreen, and L. Williams. A comparison of the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness
of vulnerability discovery techniques. Information and Software Technology, 55(7):1279
1288, 2013. 12
[19] N. Ayewah, D. Hovemeyer, J. D. Morgenthaler, J. Penix, and W. Pugh. Using static
analysis to ﬁnd bugs. Software, IEEE, 25(5):2229, 2008. 11
[20] N. Ayewah, W. Pugh, J. D. Morgenthaler, J. Penix, and Y. Zhou. Evaluating static anal-
ysis defect warnings on production software. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN-
SIGSOFT workshop on Program analysis for software tools and engineering, pages 18.
ACM, 2007. 11
[21] D. Babic. Exploiting structure for scalable software veriﬁcation. PhD thesis, University
of Zagreb, 2008. 15, 26
[22] D. F. Bacon and P. F. Sweeney. Fast static analysis of c++ virtual function calls. In
Proceedings of the 11th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Object-oriented Programming,
Systems, Languages, and Applications, OOPSLA '96, pages 324341, New York, NY,
USA, 1996. ACM. 22, 41
[23] G. Balatsouras and Y. Smaragdakis. Class hierarchy complementation: soundly complet-
ing a partial type graph. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 48, pages 515532. ACM,
2013. 21
[24] S. Bates and S. Horwitz. Incremental program testing using program dependence graphs.
In Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of pro-
gramming languages, pages 384396. ACM, 1993. 14
[25] G. Batsman. Heartbleed conspiracy theories. 38
[26] L. Batyuk, M. Herpich, S. A. Camtepe, K. Raddatz, A.-D. Schmidt, and S. Albayrak.
Using static analysis for automatic assessment and mitigation of unwanted and malicious
activities within android applications. InMalicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE),
2011 6th International Conference on, pages 6672. IEEE, 2011. 19
101
[27] K. Bennett and M. Ward. Theory and practice of middle-out programming to support
program understanding. In Program Comprehension, 1994. Proceedings., IEEE Third
Workshop on, pages 168175. IEEE, 1994. 10
[28] T. J. Biggerstaﬀ, B. G. Mitbander, and D. E. Webster. Program understanding and the
concept assignment problem. Communications of the ACM, 37(5):7282, 1994. 9
[29] A. Brühlmann and T. Gîrba. Enriching reverse engineering with annotations. Model
Driven Engineering . . . , 5301:660674, 2008. 27
[30] N. S. Bullet. Essence and accidents of software engineering, fp brooks. IEEE Computer,
20(4):1019, 1987. 8
[31] I. Burguera, U. Zurutuza, and S. Nadjm-Tehrani. Crowdroid: behavior-based malware
detection system for android. . . . of the 1st ACM workshop on . . . , 2011. 17
[32] W. Bush, J. Pincus, and D. Sielaﬀ. A static analyzer for ﬁnding dynamic programming
errors. Software-Practice and Experience, 30(7):775802, 2000. 11
[33] D. Callahan. The program summary graph and ﬂow-sensitive interprocedual data ﬂow
analysis, volume 23. ACM, 1988. 88
[34] Y. Cao, Y. Fratantonio, A. Bianchi, M. Egele, C. Kruegel, G. Vigna, and Y. Chen.
Edgeminer: Automatically detecting implicit control ﬂow transitions through the android
framework. Technical report, Stanford University, 2015. 23, 82, 87
[35] C. A. Castillo et al. Android malware past, present, and future. White Paper of McAfee
Mobile Security Working Group, 2011. 1, 16
[36] R. Chapman and A. Hilton. Enforcing security and safety models with an information
ﬂow analysis tool. In ACM SIGAda Ada Letters, volume 24, pages 3946. ACM, 2004. 23
[37] R. Chatterjee, B. G. Ryder, and W. A. Landi. Relevant context inference. In Proceedings
of the 26th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages,
pages 133146. ACM, 1999. 88
102
[38] Y. Chen. The c information abstraction system. . . . , IEEE Transactions on, 16(3), 1990.
27
[39] E. Chin, A. P. Felt, K. Greenwood, and D. Wagner. Analyzing inter-application commu-
nication in android. In Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Mobile systems,
applications, and services, MobiSys '11, pages 239252, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
19
[40] L. Clapp, S. Anand, and A. Aiken. Mining explicit information ﬂow speciﬁcations from
concrete executions. FSE, 2014. 5, 24, 82, 83, 88
[41] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. Peled. Model checking. MIT press, 1999. 54
[42] J. Cordy. Comprehending reality-practical barriers to industrial adoption of software
maintenance automation. . . . , 2003. 11th IEEE International Workshop on, 2003. 26
[43] P. Cousot and R. Cousot. Abstract interpretation: a uniﬁed lattice model for static
analysis of programs by construction or approximation of ﬁxpoints. In Proceedings of the
4th ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN symposium on Principles of programming languages, pages
238252. ACM, 1977. 54
[44] B. Dagenais. Partial program analysis, 2007. 21
[45] B. Dagenais and L. Hendren. Enabling static analysis for partial java programs. In ACM
Sigplan Notices, volume 43, pages 313328. ACM, 2008. 21
[46] G. de F Carneiro, M. Silva, L. Mara, E. Figueiredo, C. Sant'Anna, A. Garcia, and M. Men-
donça. Identifying code smells with multiple concern views. In Software Engineering
(SBES), 2010 Brazilian Symposium on, pages 128137. IEEE, 2010. 9
[47] J. Dean, D. Grove, and C. Chambers. Optimization of object-oriented programs using
static class hierarchy analysis. . . . '95-Object-Oriented Programming, 9th . . . , December,
1995. 22
[48] T. Deering. Atlas video demo. 39
103
[49] T. Deering. Flowminer: Fine-grained, compact ﬂow summaries for program analysis, 4
2015. 57, 79, 90
[50] T. Deering, S. Kothari, J. Sauceda, and J. Mathews. Atlas: A new way to explore software,
build analysis tools. In Companion Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on
Software Engineering, ICSE Companion 2014, pages 588591, New York, NY, USA, 2014.
ACM. ix, 3, 25, 39, 59, 61, 63, 79
[51] Y. Deng and S. Kothari. Using conceptual roles of data for enhanced program compre-
hension. In Reverse Engineering, 2002. Proceedings. Ninth Working Conference on, pages
119127. IEEE, 2002. 10
[52] P. Devanbu. Genoa: a customizable language-and front-end independent code analyzer.
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on . . . , pages 307317, 1992. 27
[53] G. Dini, F. Martinelli, A. Saracino, and D. Sgandurra. Madam: a multi-level anomaly
detector for android malware. In Computer network security, pages 240253. Springer,
2012. 17
[54] Q. Do, B. Martini, and K.-K. R. Choo. Exﬁltrating data from android devices. Computers
& Security, 48:7491, 2015. 16
[55] D. Dori. Why signiﬁcant uml change is unlikely. Communications of the ACM, 45(11):82
85, 2002. 8
[56] J. Ebert and D. Bildhauer. Reverse engineering using graph queries. . . . transformations
and model-driven engineering, pages 335362, 2010. 27
[57] J. Ebert, B. Kullbach, V. Riediger, and A. Winter. Gupro - generic understanding of
programs an overview. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 72(2):4756,
Nov. 2002. 27
[58] S. Elliott Sim, C. Clarke, R. Holt, and a.M. Cox. Browsing and searching software ar-
chitectures. Proceedings IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance - 1999
104
(ICSM'99). 'Software Maintenance for Business Change' (Cat. No.99CB36360), pages
381390, 1999. 27
[59] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, and B. Chun. Taintdroid: an information-ﬂow tracking system for
realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones. . . . on Operating systems . . . , 2010. 45
[60] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, S. Han, V. Tendulkar, B.-G. Chun, L. P. Cox, J. Jung, P. McDaniel,
and A. N. Sheth. Taintdroid: an information-ﬂow tracking system for realtime privacy
monitoring on smartphones. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), 32(2):5,
2014. 18
[61] W. Enck, M. Ongtang, and P. McDaniel. On lightweight mobile phone application cer-
tiﬁcation. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, pages 235245. ACM, 2009. 18
[62] M. Fagan. Design and code inspections to reduce errors in program development. In
Software pioneers, pages 575607. Springer, 2002. 11
[63] R. Fedler, J. Schütte, and M. Kulicke. On the eﬀectiveness of malware protection on
android. Fraunhofer AISEC, 2013. 45
[64] A. Feizollah, N. B. Anuar, R. Salleh, and A. W. A. Wahab. A review on feature selection
in mobile malware detection. Digital Investigation, 13:2237, 2015. 17
[65] A. P. Felt, E. Chin, S. Hanna, D. Song, and D. Wagner. Android permissions demystiﬁed.
In Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security,
pages 627638. ACM, 2011. 19, 46
[66] H. Femmer, N. Broy, M. Zec, A. MacWilliams, and R. Eckl. Dynamic software visualiza-
tion with busyborg-a proof of concept. In Computer Software and Applications Conference
(COMPSAC), 2011 IEEE 35th Annual, pages 492497. IEEE, 2011. 9
[67] J. Ferrante, K. J. Ottenstein, and J. D. Warren. The program dependence graph and
its use in optimization. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems
(TOPLAS), 9(3):319349, 1987. 7
105
[68] T. Fraser. Automated program analysis for cybersecurity (apac), July 2011. 87
[69] C. Fritz, S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer, E. Bodden, A. Bartel, J. Klein, Y. le Traon, D. Octeau,
and P. McDaniel. Highly precise taint analysis for android applications. EC SPRIDE,
TU Darmstadt, Tech. Rep, 2013. 20
[70] A. P. Fuchs, A. Chaudhuri, and J. S. Foster. Scandroid: Automated security certiﬁcation
of android applications. Technical report, Department of Computer Science, University
of Maryland, College Park, 2009. 19, 45
[71] P. Godefroid, P. de Halleux, A. V. Nori, S. K. Rajamani, W. Schulte, N. Tillmann, and
M. Y. Levin. Automating software testing using program analysis. Software, IEEE,
25(5):3037, 2008. 14
[72] M. Grace, Y. Zhou, Q. Zhang, S. Zou, and X. Jiang. Riskranker: scalable and accurate
zero-day android malware detection. In Proceedings of the 10th international conference
on Mobile systems, applications, and services, pages 281294. ACM, 2012. 20
[73] M. C. Grace, Y. Zhou, Z. Wang, and X. Jiang. Systematic detection of capability leaks
in stock android smartphones. In NDSS, 2012. 19
[74] D. Grove and C. Chambers. A framework for call graph construction algorithms. ACM
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), 23(6):685746, 2001.
22, 87
[75] K. Gui. Proving safety properties of software. PhD thesis, Iowa State University, 2012.
31, 32
[76] K. Gui et al. An empirical study to discover patterns for checking the matching pair
property. In 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software
Engineering, pages 14, 2010. 13
[77] S. Heckman and L. Williams. A model building process for identifying actionable static
analysis alerts. In Software Testing Veriﬁcation and Validation, 2009. ICST'09. Interna-
tional Conference on, pages 161170. IEEE, 2009. 13
106
[78] J. Hoﬀmann, M. Ussath, T. Holz, and M. Spreitzenbarth. Slicing droids: program slicing
for smali code. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,
pages 18441851. ACM, 2013. 20
[79] B. Holland, March 2015. 63
[80] B. Holland, T. Deering, S. Kothari, J. Mathews, and N. Ranade. Security toolbox for
detecting novel and sophisticated android malware. In Proceedings of the International
Conference of Software Engineering, to appear. IEEE Press, 2015. 61
[81] S. Horwitz, J. Prins, and T. Reps. On the adequacy of program dependence graphs for
representing programs. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium
on Principles of programming languages, pages 146157. ACM, 1988. 7
[82] D. Hovemeyer and W. Pugh. Finding bugs is easy. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 39(12):92,
Dec. 2004. 11
[83] D. Hovemeyer, J. Spacco, and W. Pugh. Evaluating and tuning a static analysis to ﬁnd
null pointer bugs. In ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, volume 31, pages
1319. ACM, 2005. 11
[84] C.-Y. Huang, Y.-T. Tsai, and C.-H. Hsu. Performance evaluation on permission-based
detection for android malware. In Advances in Intelligent Systems and Applications-
Volume 2, pages 111120. Springer, 2013. 17
[85] J. Huang, X. Zhang, L. Tan, P. Wang, and B. Liang. Asdroid: Detecting stealthy be-
haviors in android applications by user interface and program behavior contradiction. In
Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software Engineering, pages 1036
1046. ACM, 2014. 20
[86] J. Jeon, K. K. Micinski, J. A. Vaughan, A. Fogel, N. Reddy, J. S. Foster, and T. Millstein.
Dr. android and mr. hide: Fine-grained permissions in android applications. In ACM CCS
Workshop on Security and Privacy in Smartphones and Mobile Devices (SPSM), pages
314, Raleigh, NC, USA, October 2012. 18
107
[87] B. Johnson, Y. Song, E. Murphy-Hill, and R. Bowdidge. Why don't software develop-
ers use static analysis tools to ﬁnd bugs? In Software Engineering (ICSE), 2013 35th
International Conference on, pages 672681. IEEE, 2013. 13
[88] F. B. Jr. The computer scientist as toolsmith ii. Communications of the ACM, 39(3):61
68, 1996. 27, 34
[89] R. Kannavara. Securing opensource code via static analysis. In Software Testing, Veriﬁca-
tion and Validation (ICST), 2012 IEEE Fifth International Conference on, pages 429436.
IEEE, 2012. 12
[90] R. Kazman and S. J. Carrière. Playing detective: Reconstructing software architecture
from available evidence. Automated Software Engineering, 6(2):107138, 1999. 8
[91] S. C. Kothari. Scalable program comprehension for analyzing complex defects. In Program
Comprehension, 2008. ICPC 2008. The 16th IEEE International Conference on, pages 3
4. IEEE, 2008. 10
[92] S. C. Kothari, L. Bishop, J. Sauceda, and G. Daugherty. Knowledge-centric and language
independent framework for safety analysis tools. In High Assurance Systems Engineering,
2004. Proceedings. Eighth IEEE International Symposium on, pages 4555. IEEE, 2004.
13
[93] J.-F. Lalande and S. Wendzel. Hiding privacy leaks in android applications using low-
attention raising covert channels. In Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), 2013
Eighth International Conference on, pages 701710. IEEE, 2013. 16
[94] M. S. Lam, J. Whaley, V. B. Livshits, M. C. Martin, D. Avots, M. Carbin, and C. Unkel.
Context-sensitive program analysis as database queries. Proceedings of the twenty-fourth
ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems - PODS
'05, page 1, 2005. 15
108
[95] P. Lam, E. Bodden, O. Lhoták, and L. Hendren. The soot framework for java program
analysis: a retrospective. In Cetus Users and Compiler Infastructure Workshop (CETUS
2011), 2011. 15, 35
[96] R. Langner. Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon. Security & Privacy, IEEE,
9(3):4951, 2011. 1
[97] R. Langner. To kill a centrifuge. Technical report, The Langner Group,
http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf, nov
2013. 38
[98] J. W. Laski and B. Korel. A data ﬂow oriented program testing strategy. Software
Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, SE-9:347354, 1983. 14
[99] T. LaToza and B. Myers. Visualizing call graphs. In Visual Languages and Human-Centric
Computing (VL/HCC), 2011 IEEE Symposium on, pages 117124. IEEE, Sept 2011. 87
[100] S. Liang, A. W. Keep, M. Might, S. Lyde, T. Gilray, P. Aldous, and D. Van Horn.
Sound and precise malware analysis for android via pushdown reachability and entry-
point saturation. In Proceedings of the Third ACM workshop on Security and privacy in
smartphones & mobile devices, pages 2132. ACM, 2013. 20
[101] L. Lu, Z. Li, Z. Wu, W. Lee, and G. Jiang. Chex: statically vetting android apps for com-
ponent hijacking vulnerabilities. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 229240. ACM, 2012. 20
[102] M. Madsen, B. Livshits, and M. Fanning. Practical static analysis of javascript applica-
tions in the presence of frameworks and libraries. In Proceedings of the 2013 9th Joint
Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering, pages 499509. ACM, 2013. 21
[103] R. K. McLean. Comparing static security analysis tools using open source software. In
Software Security and Reliability Companion (SERE-C), 2012 IEEE Sixth International
Conference on, pages 6874. IEEE, 2012. 12
109
[104] N. Meng, Q. Wang, Q. Wu, and H. Mei. An approach to merge results of multiple static
analysis tools (short paper). In Quality Software, 2008. QSIC'08. The Eighth International
Conference on, pages 169174. IEEE, 2008. 13
[105] T. Murdock. Extensible common software graph. Web. 34, 61, 94
[106] S. Neginhal and S. Kothari. Event views and graph reductions for understanding sys-
tem level c code. In Software Maintenance, 2006. ICSM'06. 22nd IEEE International
Conference on, pages 279288. IEEE, 2006. 9
[107] F. Nielson, H. R. Nielson, and C. Hankin. Principles of program analysis. Springer Science
& Business Media, 1999. 54
[108] K. J. Ottenstein, R. A. Ballance, and A. B. MacCabe. The program dependence web: a
representation supporting control-, data-, and demand-driven interpretation of imperative
languages. In ACM SIGPLAN Notices, volume 25, pages 257271. ACM, 1990. 7
[109] K. J. Ottenstein and L. M. Ottenstein. The program dependence graph in a software
development environment. In ACM Sigplan Notices, volume 19, pages 177184. ACM,
1984. 8
[110] D. L. Parnas and M. Lawford. Guest editors' introduction: Inspection's role in software
quality assurance. IEEE Software, 20(4):1620, 2003. 8
[111] S. Paul and A. Prakash. A framework for source code search using program patterns.
Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions . . . , 1994. 27
[112] S. Paul and A. Prakash. A query algebra for program databases. Software Engineering,
IEEE Transactions . . . , 1996. 27
[113] É. Payet and F. Spoto. Static analysis of android programs. Information and Software
Technology, 54(11):11921201, 2012. 45
[114] J. A. Pienaar and R. Hundt. Jswhiz: Static analysis for javascript memory leaks. In
Code Generation and Optimization (CGO), 2013 IEEE/ACM International Symposium
on, pages 111. IEEE, 2013. 11
110
[115] M. Pnueli. Two approaches to interprocedural data ﬂow analysis. Program ﬂow analysis:
Theory and applications, pages 189234, 1981. 88
[116] S. Poeplau, Y. Fratantonio, A. Bianchi, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Execute this! analyzing
unsafe and malicious dynamic code loading in android applications. In Proceedings of the
20th Annual Network & Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2014. 18
[117] C. W. Probst. Modular control ﬂow analysis for libraries. In Static Analysis, pages
165179. Springer, 2002. 22
[118] O. Radfelder and M. Gogolla. On better understanding uml diagrams through interactive
three-dimensional visualization and animation. In Proceedings of the working conference
on Advanced visual interfaces, pages 292295. ACM, 2000. 8
[119] V. Rajlich. Intensions are a key to program comprehension. In ICPC, pages 19, 2009.
10
[120] S. Rasthofer, S. Arzt, and E. Bodden. A machine-learning approach for classifying and
categorizing android sources and sinks. In 2014 Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS), 2014. 17
[121] A. Reina, A. Fattori, and L. Cavallaro. A system call-centric analysis and stimulation
technique to automatically reconstruct android malware behaviors. In Proceedings of the
6th European Workshop on System Security (EUROSEC), Prague, Czech Republic, April
2013. 17, 45
[122] A. Rountev, S. Kagan, and T. Marlowe. Interprocedural dataﬂow analysis in the presence
of large libraries. In Compiler Construction, pages 216. Springer, 2006. 23, 88
[123] A. Rountev, M. Sharp, and G. Xu. Ide dataﬂow analysis in the presence of large object-
oriented libraries. In L. Hendren, editor, Compiler Construction, volume 4959 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 5368. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. 88
[124] J. Rumbaugh, I. Jacobson, and G. Booch. Uniﬁed Modeling Language Reference Manual,
The. Pearson Higher Education, 2004. 8
111
[125] N. Rutar, C. B. Almazan, and J. S. Foster. A comparison of bug ﬁnding tools for java. In
Software Reliability Engineering, 2004. ISSRE 2004. 15th International Symposium on,
pages 245256. IEEE, 2004. 12
[126] J. Sahs and L. Khan. A machine learning approach to android malware detection. In
Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC), 2012 European, pages 141147.
IEEE, 2012. 17
[127] G. Sarwar, O. Mehani, R. Boreli, and M. A. Kaafar. On the eﬀectiveness of dynamic
taint analysis for protecting against private information leaks on android-based devices.
In SECRYPT, pages 461468, 2013. 18
[128] R. Sato, D. Chiba, and S. Goto. Detecting android malware by analyzing manifest ﬁles.
Proceedings of the Asia-Paciﬁc Advanced Network, 36:2331, 2013. 17
[129] M. Schots, C. Werner, and M. Mendonca. Awareness and comprehension in software/sys-
tems engineering practice and education: trends and research directions. In Software
Engineering (SBES), 2012 26th Brazilian Symposium on, pages 186190. IEEE, 2012. 10
[130] A. Shabtai, U. Kanonov, Y. Elovici, C. Glezer, and Y. Weiss. "andromaly": a behavioral
malware detection framework for android devices. Journal of Intelligent Information
Systems, 38(1):161190, 2012. 17
[131] A. I. Sotirov. Automatic vulnerability detection using static source code analysis. PhD
thesis, Citeseer, 2005. 12
[132] M. Spreitzenbarth. The evil inside a droid-android malware: past, present and future. In
Proceedings of the 1st Baltic Conference on Network Security & Forensics, pages 4159,
2012. 1, 15
[133] G. Suarez-Tangil, J. E. Tapiador, P. Peris-Lopez, and J. Blasco. Dendroid: A text mining
approach to analyzing and classifying code structures in android malware families. Expert
Systems with Applications, 41(4):11041117, 2014. 20
112
[134] G. Suarez-Tangil, J. E. Tapiador, P. Peris-Lopez, and A. Ribagorda. Evolution, detection
and analysis of malware for smart devices. Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE,
16(2):961987, 2014. 16
[135] S. R. Tilley, D. B. Smith, and S. Paul. Towards a framework for program understanding.
In Program Comprehension, International Workshop on, pages 1919. IEEE Computer
Society, 1996. 9
[136] R. Tischler, R. Schauﬂer, and C. Payne. Static analysis of programs as an aid to debugging.
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 8(4):155158, 1983. 8
[137] US-CERT/NIST. Cve-2014-0160, 2014. 38
[138] US-CERT/NIST. Cve-2014-1266, 2014. 38
[139] US-CERT/NIST. Cve-2014-6271, 2014. 38
[140] A. Vetro, M. Torchiano, and M. Morisio. Assessing the precision of ﬁndbugs by mining
java projects developed at a university. In Mining Software Repositories (MSR), 2010 7th
IEEE Working Conference on, pages 110113. IEEE, 2010. 11
[141] L. Weichselbaum, M. Neugschwandtner, M. Lindorfer, Y. Fratantonio, V. van der Veen,
and C. Platzer. Andrubis: Android malware under the magnifying glass. Vienna Univer-
sity of Technology, Tech. Rep. TRISECLAB-0414-001, 2014. 18
[142] C. Werner, L. Murta, M. Schots, A. Magdaleno, M. Silva, R. Cepêda, and C. Vahia.
Evoltrack: A plug-in-based infrastructure for visualizing software evolution. In 1st Brazil-
ian Workshop on Software Visualization, Brazil, pages 18, 2011. 9
[143] D.-J. Wu, C.-H. Mao, T.-E. Wei, H.-M. Lee, and K.-P. Wu. Droidmat: Android malware
detection through manifest and api calls tracing. In Information Security (Asia JCIS),
2012 Seventh Asia Joint Conference on, pages 6269. IEEE, 2012. 45
[144] X. Wu, Z. Xu, and J. Wei. Static detection of bugs caused by incorrect exception handling
in java programs. In Quality Software (QSIC), 2011 11th International Conference on,
pages 6166. IEEE, 2011. 12
113
[145] Y. Xie and A. Aiken. Saturn: A scalable framework for error detection using boolean
satisﬁability. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS),
29(3):16, 2007. 15
[146] F. Yamaguchi, N. Golde, D. Arp, and K. Rieck. Modeling and discovering vulnerabilities
with code property graphs. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2014. 12
[147] D. Yan, G. Xu, and A. Rountev. Rethinking soot for summary-based whole-program
analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on State of the
Art in Java Program analysis, pages 914. ACM, 2012. 22, 87
[148] L.-K. Yan and H. Yin. Droidscope: Seamlessly reconstructing the os and dalvik semantic
views for dynamic android malware analysis. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages
569584, 2012. 18
[149] S. Y. Yerima, S. Sezer, G. McWilliams, and I. Muttik. A new android malware detection
approach using bayesian classiﬁcation. In Advanced Information Networking and Applica-
tions (AINA), 2013 IEEE 27th International Conference on, pages 121128. IEEE, 2013.
17
[150] W. Zhang and B. Ryder. Constructing accurate application call graphs for java to model
library callbacks. In Source Code Analysis and Manipulation, 2006. SCAM'06. Sixth IEEE
International Workshop on, pages 6374. IEEE, 2006. 87
[151] C. Zheng, S. Zhu, S. Dai, G. Gu, X. Gong, X. Han, and W. Zou. Smartdroid: an automatic
system for revealing ui-based trigger conditions in android applications. In Proceedings
of the second ACM workshop on Security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices,
pages 93104. ACM, 2012. 20
[152] M. Zheng, M. Sun, and J. C. Lui. Droid analytics: A signature based analytic system to
collect, extract, analyze and associate android malware. In Trust, Security and Privacy in
Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2013 12th IEEE International Conference
on, pages 163171. IEEE, 2013. 17
114
[153] Y. Zhou and X. Jiang. Dissecting android malware: Characterization and evolution. In
Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on, pages 95109. IEEE, 2012. 1, 16,
45
